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The Portland Digit Recognition Test, the Test of Memory Malingering, and Standard 
Neuropsychological Measures: Comparing Efficacy, the Effects of Coaching, and Face 
Validity
Director: Stuart Hall, Ph.D.
This research examined the performance of control participants and individuals feigning 
brain damage on the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM), the Portland Digit 
Recognition Test (PDRT), and standard neuropsychological tests (Trail Making Test 
Parts A and B, and the Digit Symbol Coding subtest and Incidental Learning task of the 
WAIS-III). Three primary goals were: (a) compare the ability of the TOMM and the 
PDRT to correctly classify control participants and simulated malingerers, (b) examine 
the effect of different levels of information about brain damage (i.e., coaching) provided 
to simulators, and (c) assess the face validity of the measures. Participants were 96 
college students randomly assigned to the following groups: controls, simulate brain 
damage without any additional information (i.e., no coaching), simulate brain damage 
with minimal coaching, or simulate brain damage with detailed coaching. After 
completing the tests, participants’ beliefs regarding the purpose of each test were 
obtained before and after they were informed that some tests were designed to detect 
feigned brain damage. Results indicated that the PDRT classified significantly more 
malingerers than the TOMM when using chance level responding; however, neither test 
identified malingerers at a satisfactory level. The TOMM classified significantly more 
malingerers than the PDRT when using published cutoff scores. The classification rate 
for the TOMM using cutoff scores was satisfactory (71% malingerers, 100% controls).
In general, the control group performed better than the three malingering groups; the 
malingering groups did not differ from one another based on the levels of coaching. Both 
the PDRT and the TOMM have good face validity as memory tests. Once given a clue 
that some tests were designed to detect feigned brain damage, well over half of the 
participants identified all the tests as malingering measures. Potential explanations for 
the findings and directions for future research are discussed.
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Malingering and Coaching 1
The Portland Digit Recognition Test, the Test of Memory Malingering, 
and Standard Neuropsychological Measures: Comparing Efficacy, 
the Effects of Coaching, and Face Validity
Malingering is defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f Mental 
Disorders-IV (1994) as “the intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated 
physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives” (V65.2, p. 683). 
Other researchers feel that this definition is too restrictive and view malingering as 
existing on a continuum. For example, Lipman (1962) identified the following four types 
of malingering: (a) invention, (b) perseveration, (c) exaggeration, and (d) transference. 
Invention malingering refers to cases in which people falsely claim the existence of 
symptoms that they have never experienced. Perseveration malingering occurs when 
individuals continue to claim the presence of symptoms that have since subsided. The 
third type of malingering, exaggeration, exists when the reported symptoms are worse 
than the genuine symptoms. This type of malingering is at times a result of the person 
fearing that their problem will go unnoticed if the symptoms are not exaggerated.
Lipman’s final type of malingering is seen in transference malingerers when they falsely 
attribute real symptoms to an injury other than what actually caused the symptoms. 
Rogers (1997) further defined malingering on a continuum of mild, moderate, and severe 
depending on the degree to which the malingerers exaggerate or fabricate their deficits. 
Regardless of the type or extent of malingering, people vary in the degree to which they 
are consciously aware of their actions. That is, the motivation to malinger may be driven 
by unconscious or fully conscious factors (Travin & Protter, 1984).
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Malingering in Neuropsychology 
In the area of neuropsychological assessment, the issue of malingering has been 
shown to be very important. Researchers have demonstrated that individuals with normal 
neurological function can purposefully alter their scores on neuropsychological measures, 
appearing similar to patients with brain injuries. Results such as these have stimulated a 
large amount of research designed to develop techniques to detect malingerers in 
neuropsychological assessments.
Research aimed at detecting malingering in neuropsychology dates back to when 
Rey (1941) developed one of the first measures specifically designed to detect 
malingerers. The aim was for these malingering measures to be easy for patients while 
appearing difficult to malingerers. This testing paradigm allows differences to emerge 
between people responding honestly and malingerers. In addition to malingering tests, 
researchers have also determined that scores on standard neuropsychological measures 
can be useful in detecting malingering. While taking these tests, malingerers typically 
overestimate the severity of neurological deficits and produce patterns of scores that are 
distinguishable from the scores obtained from actual neurological patients (Benton & 
Spreen, 1961; Goebel, 1983; Heaton, Smith, Lehman, & Vogt, 1978).
Unfortunately, researchers using malingering tests and standard 
neuropsychological measures have shown that many of these techniques have notable 
limitations. For example, the tests often fail to distinguish between patients performing 
honestly (poor specificity) and people exaggerating deficits (poor sensitivity; Guilmette, 
Hart, Giuliano, & Leininger, 1994; Schretlen, Brandt, Krafft, & Van Gorp, 1991). 
Additionally, the purpose and ease of some of the tests are apparent to many individuals
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(poor face validity; Beetar & Williams, 1995; Hiscock & Hiscock, 1989; Hiscock, 
Branham, & Hiscock, 1994). Finally, the tests often fail to provide consistent evidence 
across different studies and various populations, making it difficult to draw trustworthy 
conclusions regarding the efficacy of the tests in identifying malingerers (lack of 
conclusiveness; Binks, Gouvier, & Waters, 1997; Greiffenstein Baker, & G ola, 1994; 
Hiscock et al., 1994).
Techniques Used to Detect Malingering
Clinical Judgment
Malingerers often exhibit behaviors that differ significantly from real patients. 
Malingering may be suspected when individuals show a disparity between 
neuropsychological performance and other aspects of their presentation. That is, an 
individual may be capable of functioning normally at his/her job but obtain scores on 
neuropsychological tests indicative of severe impairment (Cercy, Schretlen, & Brandt,
1997). Disparity between symptom complaints, objective test findings, and severity of 
injury is also common (Ruff, Wylie, & Tennant, 1993). Specifically, a person may 
present with symptoms that are indicative of a severe head injury while the medical test 
findings and description of the origin of injury suggest a mild injury. Furthermore, 
reports provided by the patients and their friends and family many times do not add up to 
a believable, consistent picture (Iverson, 1995).
In addition to the above indicators, malingerers may exhibit the following 
characteristics. They may report sudden onset of symptoms and exaggerate the symptoms 
to the extent of producing a bizarre portrayal of the condition. Malingerers may also 
show signs of frustration and aggravation during the evaluation (Iverson, 1995).
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Additionally, they may act evasive, unfriendly, suspicious, and uncooperative. While 
responding to test questions, they may miss very easy items while correctly answering 
difficult ones, give up easily, and claim they do not know many of the answers. Finally, 
many patients may resist treatment, refuse employment, and blame all their problems on 
the disorder in question (Ruff et al., 1993).
Many of these indicators and characteristics rely largely on subjective clinical 
judgment. When an individual portrays certain characteristics, clinicians must determine 
if the individual's portrayal is representative of a neurological condition, malingering, or 
various extraneous factors that can influence how someone behaves during the interview 
and testing sessions. This judgment can at times be beneficial during the diagnostic 
process. For example, a clinician’s opinion regarding the above indicators, provides 
additional data that can be integrated with objective test data. Specifically, a patient’s 
behavior during the interview and information in their records can aid clinicians when 
they are attempting to understand various discrepancies and atypical test patterns 
indicative of malingering (Auerbach, 1992; Ruff et al., 1993). Moreover, some 
researchers have suggested that clinicians who are experienced in neurological disorders 
may be able to use their expertise to determine what symptoms are likely real and 
whether the medical history, test findings, and behavioral indicators provide a consistent 
picture (Auerbach, 1992; Pankratz & Binder, 1997).
Contrary to providing beneficial information, clinical judgment may be 
detrimental while the clinician is determining a patient’s diagnosis. If a clinician believes 
that a person is malingering, then this belief can negatively affect rapport and bias the 
clinician’s diagnostic decisions (Ruff et al., 1993; Zielinski, 1994). When clinicians are
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biased, they may fail to consider alternative explanations for the individual’s behavior. 
Many things other than malingering, such as fatigue, depression, pain, anxiety, 
medication side-effects, and the neurological condition in question can influence how a 
person behaves during the interview and testing process (Ruff et al., 1993; Zielinski, 
1994). As previously mentioned, experience may aid some clinicians while they are 
making diagnostic decisions. When clinicians do not have the necessary training, they 
may be unable to adequately distinguish between real symptoms and malingering 
behaviors (Brandt, 1988), leading to misdiagnoses that seriously affect patients’ lives 
(Zielinski, 1994). Finally, clinicians who depend on specific indicators to aid in the 
diagnostic process may fail to detect those malingerers who do not show such 
indicators. As a result of these issues, the data that are gathered based on clinical 
judgment should never be considered solely as signatures of malingering (Ruff et al., 
1993; Zielinski, 1994).
Performance on Neuropsychological Tests
Researchers have demonstrated that simulators are capable of faking neurological 
deficits on some of the traditional neuropsychological tests, producing levels of 
impairment that are similar to brain injury patients. When considering the numerical 
score obtained by simulators and brain injury patients on neuropsychological tests, some 
researchers have had a difficult time distinguishing between the groups of participants on 
certain measures. In light of such findings, researchers have also investigated the type of 
responses that people provide on tests as a way to classify simulators and neurological 
patients. These researchers have found that although simulators are able to lower their 
scores to appear brain damaged, they often overexaggerate specific deficits and produce
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patterns of scores on certain neuropsychological tests that differ from actual brain injury 
patients (Benton & Spreen, 1961; Goebel, 1983; Heaton et al., 1978; Suhr & Gunstad, 
2000). The simulators’ patterns often do not make neurological sense, reflecting the 
erroneous beliefs that many laypersons have about neurological conditions and their 
associated sequelae (Aubrey, Dobbs, & Rule, 1989). Throughout several decades, 
researchers have identified different patterns between simulators and neurological 
patients on tests measuring motor ability, attention, memory, sensory-perceptual 
functioning, language, IQ, visuospatial skills, and personality (Benton & Spreen, 1961; 
Bernard, 1990; Goebel, 1983; Hayward, Hall, Hunt, & Zubrick, 1987; Heaton et al.,
1978; Mittenberg, Azrin, Millsaps, & Heilbronner, 1993).
Benton and Spreen (1961) conducted one of the initial studies showing that 
neuropsychological tests can be faked. They administered the Visual Retention Test to 47 
college students, 23 medical patients without history of head injury or cerebral 
dysfunction, and 48 patients with cerebral damage. The researchers found that the college 
students and medical patients, serving as simulators, could be reliably distinguished from 
brain injury patients. In fact, the simulators tended to perform worse than patients with 
actual brain injuries. In addition, malingerers made more distortion errors while the brain 
injury patients made more omission and addition errors. This study showed that 
malingerers typically overestimate the severity of deficit (performing significantly worse 
than true brain injury patients) and present with atypical patterns of performance.
Heaton et al. (1978) conducted another landmark study and discovered that the 
level of functioning in simulators and head injury patients was similar on the Halstead- 
Reitan Battery and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS). However, while
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simulators were able to lower their scores to be similar to head injury patients, several 
differences emerged between the test patterns produced by the two groups. Specifically, 
the malingerers obtained worse scores than the head injury patients on attentional, 
sensory-perceptual, and motor tasks. In contrast, the head injury patients did significantly 
worse on tasks measuring concept formation, general brain abilities, and tactile form 
discrimination and dexterity.
Heaton and colleagues (1978) also determined that the simulators had higher 
scores than the patients on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI).
The simulators’ profiles showed elevations on the F scale and the following clinical 
scales: Hypochondriasis, Hysteria, Paranoia, Psychasthenia, Schizophrenia, and Social 
Introversion. Elevations on a malingerer’s profile appear to occur because of a tendency 
to overexaggerate negative symptoms. In contrast, neurological patients typically endorse 
symptoms that produce elevations that reflect bona-fide physiological and cognitive 
symptoms associated with their neurological conditions. Scales that are commonly 
elevated in neurological patients are Depression, Psychasthenia, and Schizophrenia 
(Cullum & Bigler, 1987).
Numerous additional studies have contributed to the findings that 
neuropsychological test performance differs between participants feigning neurological 
deficits and people responding honestly. For example, Goebel (1983) discovered that 
participants simulating various types of brain damage were unable to produce believable 
test patterns on tasks measuring a variety of cognitive abilities. Hayward et al. (1987) 
asked registered nurses to fake deficits suggestive of left fronto-temporal damage. Even 
though the nurses had years of experience working with neurological disorders, they
Malingering and Coaching 8
faked deficits that differed significantly from neurological patients, which resulted in 
atypical patterns of performance. Bernard (1990) discovered that participants simulating 
cognitive deficits on neuropsychological memory tests performed significantly lower 
than controls on 20 of 22 scores. Furthermore, Mittenberg et al. (1993) reported that their 
simulators scored one standard deviation below average on general memory tasks and 
two standard deviations below average on tasks measuring attention and concentration. 
This pattern of performance does not make neurological sense because it is necessary to 
first sufficiently attend to a task in order to remember the information for the memory 
task.
Researchers have examined serial position effects as another way to distinguish 
simulators and neurological patients. The serial position effect is observed when people 
recall items at the beginning (primacy effect) and the end (recency effect) of the list with 
higher frequency than items at the middle of the list, thus resulting in a “U” shaped 
learning curve (Rundus, 1971). Bernard (1991) found that simulators suppressed the 
primacy effect and closed head injury patients suppressed the recency effect on the Rey 
Auditory Verbal Learning Test. As expected the control participants demonstrated the 
typical “U” shaped curve. Contrary to the above study Bernard, Houston, and Natoli 
(1993) did not find significant serial position differences between the control and 
simulating participants. Finally, Wiggins and Brandt (1988) found that amnesiacs 
suppressed the primacy effect, but simulators produced the typical “U” shaped curve. 
These findings indicate that the serial position effect fails to provide a consistent way to 
distinguish between malingerers and people who respond honestly.
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Researchers administering memory tests that utilize a recall and recognition 
format have demonstrated differences between simulators and head injury patients. 
Simulators consistently perform worse on recognition tasks than on recall tasks (Beetar & 
Williams, 1995; Bernard, 1990; Wiggins & Brandt, 1988). Often their recognition 
performance shows severe impairment while their recall performance is within normal 
limits. This pattern is directly opposite of what typically happens with normal individuals 
and people with neurological impairments. The simulators’ results are explained by two 
reasons. First, simulators do not realize that recognition performance is often intact in 
head injury patients; therefore, they overexaggerate their feigned deficits. Second, it is 
often difficult for simulators to determine what constitutes poor recall performance. 
Patterns Across Tests
Patients often undergo multiple evaluations that include many of the same tests. 
Therefore, Cullum, Heaton, and Grant (1991) proposed that examining a person’s 
consistency of results across repeated evaluations is another useful technique for 
identifying feigned or exaggerated symptoms. Discrepancies occur when malingerers are 
not able to reproduce the same test patterns from one testing period to another. In order to 
reproduce the same patterns, malingerers must remember their previous responses and 
understand the sequelae of their feigned condition (Cullum et al., 1991; Owens, 1995). 
Additionally, malingerers’ performances often differ from what is typically observed 
when patients perform in an honest manner. Due to practice effects, retest scores obtained 
from real patients with stable neurological conditions (i.e., no new or developing 
neurological problems) tend to be the same or higher than previous test scores (Cullum et 
al., 1991).
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The Halstead-Reitan Battery produces reliable, consistent scores when used in 
retest situations. Using this battery, Cullum et al. (1991) reported test results obtained 
from three litigating head injury patients. The patients did not have any evidence of 
complications that could cause deterioration in their functioning. All three patients 
produced variable test findings. Specifically, each patient’s scores increased on some 
measures and decreased on others across multiple testing periods. The variability in 
performance was determined to be inconsistent with what typically occurs in retest 
situations when patients with stable conditions perform to the best of their ability. 
Consequently, each patient’s performance was considered indicative of malingering.
Reitan and Wolfson (1997) administered the Halstead-Reitan Battery and either 
the original version of the WAIS or the Revised Edition (WAIS-R) to 40 head injury 
patients. Half of the patients were involved in litigation. Compared to their initial scores, 
nonlitigating patients obtained higher retest scores on each of the tests. Conversely, the 
litigating patients obtained lower retest scores on every test. The litigating patients’ retest 
scores did not show the improvement that typically occurs as a result of practice effects 
and previous exposure. This study and the research conducted by Cullum et al. (1991) 
show that responses that do not stay the same or do not improve across multiple testing 
periods are inconsistent with retest expectations and are possible signatures of 
malingering.
In summary, researchers have discovered that people can successfully fake 
deficits to the extent of appearing brain damaged; however, their test patterns and overall 
presentation often differ from real patients. Malingerers typically cannot fake patterns of 
deficit that make neurological sense. Nevertheless, clinicians’ ability to consistently
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detect malingerers using clinical judgment and standard neuropsychological assessment 
batteries is poor (Faust, Hart, & Guilmette, 1988; Heaton et al., 1978). Consequently, 
neuropsychologists have been interested in developing specific tests for detecting 
malingered test performance.
Specific Malingering Tests
Researchers have developed measures specifically designed to detect malingering. 
The principle guiding the development of malingering tests was based on the notion that 
malingerers tend to overestimate deficits on tests, particularly when they believe the tests 
are difficult. Thus, researchers have attempted to design measures that are easy for 
patients with brain damage yet appear difficult. This test paradigm often allows 
differences to emerge between feigned and bona fide deficits. That is, malingerers tend to 
perform poorly, viewing the tests as difficult measures. In contrast, many patients are 
capable of obtaining high scores due to the ease of the tests (Iverson, Franzen, & 
McCracken, 1991). Examples of popular malingering measures that are commonly used 
are the Dot Counting Test (DCT) and the Fifteen-Item Memory Test (FIT).
The DCT, developed by Rey (1941) and described by Lezak (1995), is an 
instrument specifically designed to detect malingering behaviors. People are asked to 
count the dots as quickly as possible after the dots are presented on 3” X 5” cards. The 
total number of dots counted and response time are recorded. The first packet of six cards 
contains sets of ungrouped dots, and sets of grouped dots are presented on the second 
packet of six cards. Lezak (1995) suggested that malingering should be suspected when 
the time required to count the grouped dots exceeds the time needed to count the 
ungrouped dots. Furthermore, suspicions should surface when counting times are
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inconsistent and not dependent on the number of dots presented. That is, when it takes 
people more time to count a lesser amount of dots, then malingering should be suspected 
(Binks et al., 1997). In order to test Lezak’s assertions several researchers have 
investigated the DCT as a way to detect malingering. Although some researchers were 
able to differentiate between malingerers and nonmalingerers (Binks et al., 1997), many 
other researchers have found the test to be inept at detecting malingerers (For a review 
see Greiffenstein et al., 1994; Hiscock et al., 1994; Rose, Hall, Szalda-Petree, & Bach,
1998).
The FIT was also developed by Rey (1964) and described by Lezak (1995).
People are presented 15 items for 10 s and then they are asked to draw the items from 
memory. Using the FIT to assess patients, researchers have shown mixed results. Due to 
the similarities among the rows of stimuli, some researchers have found that the test is 
easy for many individuals (For a review see Beetar & Williams, 1995; Hiscock et al., 
1994; Loring, 1995). Contrary to studies demonstrating the ease of the FIT, other 
researchers have discovered that patients with genuine neurological deficits do not 
consistently perform above the suggested cutoff scores, thus making them hard to 
distinguish from malingerers (For a review see Guilmette et al., 1994; Morgan, 1991; 
Rose et al., 1998; Schretlen et al., 1991).
In summary, these tests designed to detect malingering have been criticized for 
two reasons. First, malingerers sometimes detect the purpose of the tests and perform in 
the nonimpaired range. Second, these tests are challenging for some people with brain 
damage, making the distinction between brain damage patients and malingerers difficult
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(Cercy et al., 1997). Because both of these issues result in diagnostic limitations, 
researchers have focused their energy on developing more efficient measures.
Symptom Validity Techniques
Originajly designed to detect deceptive sensory deficits, symptom validity 
techniques were adapted to be used in detecting feigned memory deficits (Binder & 
Pankratz, 1987; Hiscock et al., 1994; Pankratz, Fausti, & Peed, 1975; Ruff et al., 1993).
In this paradigm, an initial stimulus, the target item, is presented to the individual. Then 
the target and a foil (two-alternative) are presented, and the person is required to choose 
one response (forced-choice) from the two possibilities. Because of this type of format, 
many symptom validity techniques are commonly referred to as two-alternative, forced- 
choice tests. Given that only two possible choices are provided, participants have a 50% 
chance of getting the correct answer when presented with a large number of trials (Binder 
& Willis, 1991; Hiscock & Hiscock, 1989). Accordingly, even if patients do not have any 
knowledge regarding the stimuli, which would be the case with total amnesia, they 
should get 50% of the questions correct simply due to the probability of chance.
Symptom validity techniques are used in two ways to detect malingerers. First, 
performance is compared to chance levels. Malingerers often overestimate deficits caused 
by a particular neurological disorder and believe that answering 50% of the questions 
correctly will prove they are not disabled. Therefore, they may perform below the level of 
chance, which is compelling evidence that they are intentionally responding incorrectly 
(Bernard et al., 1993; Loring, 1995). Unfortunately, researchers have found that not all 
malingerers consistently perform this poorly (For a review see Binder, 1993; Binder & 
Willis, 1991; Hiscock et al., 1994; Iverson et al., 1991; Tombaugh, 1997). Consequently,
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established cutoff scores are commonly used. These scores are above chance level of 
responding but lower than the scores produced by most brain injury patients and people 
without neurological disorders. Thus, malingerers are suspected when their test scores are 
lower than the scores obtained from patients (Hiscock et al., 1994; Tombaugh, 1997).
Binder and Pankratz (1987) suggested administering 100 forced-choice trials, 
making it more difficult for malingerers to monitor their performance. As they respond 
across trials, malingerers tend to reveal inconsistent response patterns. Binder and 
Pankratz used the symptom validity procedure with a 5 3-year-old woman and confirmed 
that the patient was performing significantly below chance when asked to specify 
whether she had been shown a black or yellow pen.
Hiscock and Hiscock (1989) believed that higher-functioning patients may react 
suspiciously to the simple task of identifying which pen had been presented. Therefore, 
they created a task that would be better suited for a broader range of patients. Instead of a 
pen as the target item, a 5-digit number is used in order to make the task appear more 
difficult. Hiscock and Hiscock’s task consists of eight 5-digit numbers and 72 trials. Each 
target number is presented for 5 s, followed by response cards consisting of the target and 
a foil that are presented after a delay of either 5, 10, or 15 s. The task includes a trial-by- 
trial feedback component that allows malingerers to adjust their performance downward 
if they believe they are performing too well for a patient with bona fide deficits. Although 
the 5-digit numbers help create the impression that the task is difficult, in actuality people 
need to remember only the first or last digit in order to distinguish the target number from 
the foil item. Hiscock and Hiscock administered this test to a 45-year-old patient with
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memory deficits and discovered that the patient obtained an overall score of 29% correct, 
a score significantly below chance level.
Binder (1990) further modified Hiscock and Hiscock’s (1989) test by adding an 
interpolated task between stimulus presentation and recall. The Portland Digit 
Recognition Test (PDRT) is a 72 item, two-alternative, forced-choice test. The target 
items are 5-digit numbers that are presented at the rate of one digit per second. After this 
presentation, 5, 15, and 30 s delays occur during which time the participant counts 
backward from 20, 50, and 100 respectively. These delays are incorporated to make the 
test appear more difficult. Following the interpolated counting activity, the participant is 
presented a card containing the target item and a foil item (Binder, 1993; Binder &
Willis, 1991; Iverson et al., 1994).
Litigating patients have been shown to perform significantly worse than 
nonlitigating patient on the PDRT. Additionally, simulators have been known to achieve 
the worst PDRT performance when compared to litigating and nonlitigating patients 
(Binder, 1993; Binder & Willis, 1991). Furthermore, Binder (1993) found that 26% of 
litigating patients fell below the established cutoff score while only 10% fell below 
chance level performance on the PDRT total score.
Rose, Hall, and Szalda-Petree (1995) developed a computerized version of the 
PDRT (PDRT-C) that has proven to be equivalent to the PDRT manual version when 
distinguishing between simulators, head injury patients, and controls. In addition to 
measuring participants’ total number of correct responses, the PDRT-C assesses response 
latency in order to substantiate the notion that malingerers frequently take longer to 
answer questions than most people answering honestly (Iverson, 1995). An increase in
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response latency may reflect malingerers' tendencies to overexaggerate their feigned 
deficits. Moreover, malingerers have to identify the correct answer and decide whether 
they want to respond accurately. If they decide to reject the correct answer, then they 
must take additional time to choose an incorrect response. Conversely, individuals 
responding honestly simply need to identify and choose the correct answer (Cercy et al., 
1997).
Rose et al. (1995) confirmed that malingerers take longer to respond than controls 
on the PDRT-C. Furthermore, the researchers determined that classification errors were 
reduced by 32% when response latency and the PDRT-C total score were used to 
distinguish between head injury patients and malingering simulators. Moreover, 
classification rates for patients and simulators increased from 72% when using only the 
total score to 81% when both response latency and total score were used.
In summary, symptom validity techniques are one of the most sensitive tools for 
detecting malingering behavior (Guilmette et al., 1994). Malingerers can unequivocally 
be detected when their performance is lower than would be expected based on the 
probability of chance. Additionally, they may still be detected when their scores are 
above chance levels but below the scores obtained from neurological patients. Although 
these techniques have shown promise, they are typically boring for people to take and 
they often require a substantial amount of time to administer. These disadvantages limit 
their utility (Lezak, 1995). As a result, researchers continue to search for improved 
methods for detecting malingering behaviors.
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Coaching
While studying malingering, many researchers have devoted time to 
understanding the impact that coaching has on test performance. Coaching involves 
providing information about a particular disorder (e.g., head injury) to simulators who are 
asked to feign deficits associated with the disorder in order to help the participants 
perform more similar to real patients (Rogers, Gillis, Bagby, & Monteiro, 1991). At 
times, some researchers assume that malingerers are detected because they lack 
knowledge about their expressed condition. When researchers rely on this assumption, 
malingerers who are knowledgeable about their condition may escape detection. 
Therefore, it is necessary to understand how this information affects test results (Martin, 
Gouvier, Todd, Bolter, & Niccolls, 1992).
The extent to which people are successful at faking may depend on the level of 
knowledge they possess about the manifestations of the disorder they are malingering. 
Individuals undergoing neuropsychological assessment can easily obtain knowledge 
about their condition. Libraries, support groups, physicians’ and lawyers’ offices, and the 
internet are among the many places people can go to get information. When people get 
information about their condition, they may produce test scores that are more similar to 
neurological patients than the test scores produced by people who do not obtain 
additional information. Thus, the similarities between the test scores of informed 
malingerers and patients make it more difficult for clinicians to distinguish between the 
two groups. Consequently, developing assessment strategies that can be used to identify 
malingerers who are knowledgeable about their condition should be an integral part of 
malingering research.
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Although coaching techniques need to be further investigated, Ben-Porath (1994) 
cautioned researchers to consider the ethical issues involved with this type of research 
strategy. When researchers coach participants on specific test strategies and then publish 
this information, they risk undermining the assessment process because knowledge of 
these strategies can impact a psychological test’s integrity. Results from published 
coaching studies have the potential to help malingerers present more realistic test 
patterns, thus decreasing the probability of being detected. On the other hand, coaching 
studies provide clinicians and researchers beneficial information about how knowledge 
affects test results. Consequently, it is the researcher’s responsibility to weigh the costs 
and benefits and to determine the extent of information that is published.
Compared to simulators who are not provided with additional information, 
simulators who are given information about head injuries are more capable of producing 
test results that resemble real patients’ results. Kerr et al. (1990) provided simulators a 
magazine article regarding head injury effects, and they found that their participants’ 
performance closely resembled the performance of real patients. Martin et al. (1992) 
conducted a study and found that 38 of the 40 naive (uncoached) simulators performed 
worse than the lowest brain injury patient’s score. The sophisticated simulators, who had 
received a warning to perform above chance levels and to miss more hard items than easy 
ones, scored higher than the naive simulators. Although coaching improved the 
performance of the sophisticated malingerers, 60% still performed worse than the 
patients. Hiscock et al. (1994) administered seven measures to controls, coached 
simulators, and naive (uncoached) simulators. They discovered that only the forced- 
choice Digit Memory Test distinguished between coached and naive participants. These
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studies indicate that additional information aided coached simulators during their 
presentation. However, coaching did not allow all individuals to escape detection.
Rose et al. (1995) used the PDRT-C to examine the effects of coaching. The 
coached malingerers received a description of head injury sequelae and were told to make 
their presentation “believable” and to not be “too obvious” by overly exaggerating 
impairments. The uncoached malingerers who were simply told to feign brain damage 
scored significantly below the coached malingerers, controls, and closed head injury 
patients. Using only the total correct score, the researchers correctly classified 83% of the 
uncoached malingerers and 47% of the coached malingerers. When the total correct score 
and response latency data were considered, classification rates decreased to 79% for the 
uncoached malingerers and increased to 70% for the coached malingerers. Overall, these 
results show that people who were provided information about head injuries were better 
able to escape detection but still many were detected.
The findings from a study conducted by Hall and Parker (1996) indicated that 
participants given very minimal coaching scored well above the cutoff score of 39 on the 
PDRT-C. The coaching manipulation consisted of simply telling people to make their 
presentation of brain damage “believable” without making it “too obvious”. No 
information was provided on how to accomplish this task, and they were not given 
information about the effects of head injuries. Interestingly, their scores were higher than 
those from a coached group in the previously mentioned study by Rose et al. (1995). The 
results of the Hall and Parker study are obviously disturbing because true malingerers 
will understand they at least need to make their presentation believable and not too 
obvious regardless if they invest time into obtaining information about the condition.
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Johnson and Lesniak-Karpiak (1997) studied the effects of providing simulators a 
warning that there are ways to detect insufficient performance. Compared to simulators 
who were not warned, those receiving the warning obtained higher scores on verbal and 
general memory tasks. However, the two groups did not differ significantly on tasks 
measuring attention and concentration, motor ability, and visual memory. The results 
show that warning simulators that their malingered performance can be detected helps 
them improve their performance on some but not all measures.
In summary, results from studies employing coaching techniques show that 
people who are provided with information about the disorder in question are better able to 
portray a symptom picture similar to real patients than individuals who do not receive 
additional information. However, no coaching technique has allowed all simulating 
participants to rerPain undetected. Many malingerers are detected even after they have 
obtained information because they do not entirely understand how true patients respond 
to questions (Loring, 1995).
Comparison of Malingering Tests
Rose et al. (1998) compared the PDRT to three other malingering measures: The 
Rey Dot Counting Test (Lezak, 1995; Rey, 1941), the Nonverbal Forced Choice Test 
(Frederick & Foster, 1991), and the 21-Item Word List (Iverson et al., 1991). The four 
measures were administered to normal controls, head injury patients, and college students 
instructed to fake a head injury. Thirty college students were coached on the effects of 
head injuries, and 30 college students were uncoached. Considering all four tests, only 
29% of the coached students were detected compared to 47% of the uncoached students. 
Only the PDRT correctly identified malingerers without misclassifying the head injury
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patients. Moreover, the PDRT identified 47% of the coached malingerers compared to a 
detection rate of 33% or less of the coached individuals by each of the other three tests. 
When the coached and uncoached malingering groups were combined, the PDRT 
correctly classified 66% of the malingering participants and 89% of the head injury 
patients, resulting in a total hit rate of 74% compared to a total hit rate that was no better 
than chance by each of the other three tests.
Although Rose and colleagues (1998) demonstrated that the PDRT was superior 
at accurately classifying patients and in detecting both uncoached and coached 
participants, the test is not without disadvantages. Because of these disadvantages, some 
clinicians are hesitant to use the PDRT. First, the test takes approximately 45 min to 1 hr 
to administer. This lengthy administration time and the relatively easy nature of the 
PDRT cause many patients to become annoyed and bored with the entire assessment 
process, which may negatively affect their performance on many tests (Lezak, 1995). The 
lengthy administration time is also problematic given that neuropsychological evaluations 
are typically expensive and often take an entire day to complete. Thus, spending close to 
1 hr to rule out malingering is not feasible. Finally, although most patients tend to find 
the PDRT easy, researchers have also demonstrated that the test is difficult for some 
patients with bona-fide deficits. Thus, patients and malingerers may obtain similar scores 
on the PDRT, making it difficult to distinguish between them (Binder & Willis, 1991).
Test of Memory Malingering 
In response to the problems associated with current measures, researchers are 
searching for improved methods. The Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM) is a 
malingering instrument that shows promise. The test was designed to examine
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recognition memory because literature has shown that people with neurological 
impairments generally obtain a high number of correct scores on picture recognition 
tasks. Thus, differences are likely to emerge between people with neurological 
impairments and malingerers who often overestimate impairments (Tombaugh, 1997).
The TOMM employs a two-alternative, forced-choice paradigm consisting of two 
learning trials and a delayed retention trial. On each learning trial, 50 drawings are 
presented at 3 s intervals; a two-choice panel containing a target and foil follows each 
trial. After finishing two trials and receiving feedback for each response, participants 
complete a retention trial following a 15 min delay period (Tombaugh, 1997).
Several studies have been conducted using the TOMM. An initial normative study 
was conducted on 405 volunteers ranging in age from 16 to 84 years. Participants were 
administered the original version of the TOMM and were asked to choose the target item 
when it was paired with three new drawings (foil items). The participants recognized 
99% of the target items on Trial 2 and the retention trial, showing that people without 
neurological impairments are capable of achieving high scores on the TOMM. Moreover, 
people’s estimate regarding the number of pictures that they would be able to identify 
was significantly lower than their obtained scores, substantiating the notion that the 
TOMM has good face validity as a difficult test (Tombaugh, 1997).
Tombaugh (1997) formed an additional normative sample consisting of 70 
volunteers ranging in age from 17 to 73 years. The new sample was administered the 
modified version of the TOMM, which is a forced-choice test that incorporates a 
feedback component following each response. Thus, the original four-alternative test was 
changed to the currently used two-alternative version. Analyses showed that the
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participants’ scores for both normative samples were similar, indicating that the original 
and currently used versions are equivalent.
Researchers have conducted studies to determine how patients with a variety of 
diagnoses perform on the TOMM. Using cutoff scores and chance levels of responding, 
Rees, Tombaugh, Gansler, and Moczynski (1998) reported significant differences 
between hospital control patients, litigating traumatic brain injury (TBI) patients, and 
nonlitigating TBI patients. The researchers found that the litigating patients performed 
significantly worse than the nonlitigating TBI and hospital control patients who obtained 
nearly perfect scores on every trial.
Tombaugh (1997) further investigated patients’ performance by administering the 
TOMM to 161 nonlitigating patients with the following diagnoses: no cognitive 
impairment, cognitive impairment, aphasia, TBI, and dementia. Results indicated that on 
Trial 2 the patients with dementia averaged 92% correct. The other four groups of 
patients averaged scores that exceeded 97% correct, with the majority of the patients 
obtaining perfect scores. Consequently, patients with a variety of diagnoses are capable 
of achieving high scores on the TOMM.
Researchers have investigated how knowledge regarding head injuries influences 
people’s scores on the TOMM. Tombaugh (1997) tested 41 cognitively intact students. 
The 20 coached simulators were given 1 week to gather information on the effects of 
head injuries using any information available (e.g., books, lectures, friends, etc.). Then, 
the participants were asked to realistically simulate the effects of a head injury while 
completing several tests in addition to the TOMM. The simulators’ scores averaged only 
a few points higher than chance level, and none of the scores was higher than 42.
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Average scores obtained from the 21 control students were nearly perfect. Thus, a cutoff 
score of 45 on Trial 2 correctly classified every individual. Moreover, Rees et al. (1998) 
tested 10 cognitively intact people and 18 TBI patients. Eight of the TBI patients were 
asked to exaggerate existing or previously experienced symptoms. They scored 
significantly lower than the other TBI patients and controls. Thus, personal knowledge 
and experience of TBI did not allow the patients’ exaggerated performance to go 
undetected.
On a limited basis, researchers have examined face validity for the TOMM. 
Tombaugh (1997) found that participants viewed the TOMM as a memory measure when 
it was administered along with the Hiscock test. Moreover, Rees et al. (1998) determined 
that the TOMM was viewed as a memory test when it was administered along with many 
other neuropsychological measures. These researchers examined participants’ beliefs 
regarding the face validity of the TOMM via a debriefing interview. Although the 
specifics regarding the exact questioning and techniques that the researchers used to 
obtain this information are not known, the results show that the TOMM has good face 
validity as a memory test and is not an obvious measure of malingering.
To summarize, based on the studies conducted thus far, the TOMM appears to 
offer improvements needed in malingering measures. The TOMM has a brief 
administration time, typically requiring only 15 min to complete. In addition, differences 
have been shown between litigating TBI patients and nonlitigating TBI patients. 
Moreover, neurologically impaired patients are capable of recognizing all 50 target 
pictures on the TOMM, distinguishing them from malingerers who often assume that 
they should perform poorly given the difficult appearance of the test. Thus, researchers
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have achieved high classification rates between people performing honestly (high 
specificity) and people exaggerating deficits (high sensitivity). Researchers have also 
detected coached student simulators and patients who are knowledgeable about head 
injuries. Finally, people tend to view the TOMM as a difficult memory test; therefore, it 
has good face validity (Rees et al., 1998; Tombaugh, 1997). In conclusion, these many 
advantages make the TOMM a desirable instrument that warrants further research.
Purpose of the Present Study 
There were three primary goals of this study. One goal was to compare the PDRT 
and the TOMM in their ability to distinguish between controls and three groups of 
simulated malingerers. When compared to three other malingering tests, the PDRT was 
superior to other popular malingering tests in classifying patients and simulators (Rose et 
al., 1998). To date few researchers have compared measures that are commonly used to 
detect insufficient performance. Therefore, it was useful to compare the PDRT and the 
TOMM.
A second goal was to manipulate the amount of coaching that was given to the 
simulated malingerers in order to determine how much information is necessary for 
people to realistically feign a head injury. Specifically, each malingerer received either no 
coaching, a warning to perform in a believable manner, or information about head injury 
effects. Thus, three types of instructions varying in the degree of coaching information 
were provided to the malingering participants. As previously reviewed, researchers have 
shown that coaching simulators on the effects of head injury helps those individuals 
perform more similar to head injury patients than when people do not receive coaching 
(Hall & Parker, 1996; Hiscock et al., 1994; Johnson & Lesniak-Karpiak, 1997; Kerr et
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al., 1990; Martin et al., 1992; Rose et al., 1995, 1998). Therefore, it was necessary to 
evaluate levels of coaching when determining the efficacy of the PDRT and the TOMM. 
Currently, there are no known studies that have examined the effects of varying levels of 
coaching.
A third goal was to examine the face validity of the measures. As previously 
described, face validity for the TOMM has been investigated in a limited manner. The 
literature is lacking in information on the face validity for the PDRT and for the standard 
neuropsychological tests that were administered. Thus, this study explored in depth 
participants’ beliefs regarding the purpose of each test.
Hypotheses
1) The first hypothesis was based on participants’ expected test performance 
according to chance levels for the PDRT (36 correct) and all three trials on the TOMM 
(25 correct). Specifically, Uncoached Malingerers (UCM) were predicted to perform 
lower than chance levels on both tests. The Minimally Coached Malingerers (MCM), the 
Detailed Coached Malingerers (DCM), and the controls were expected to obtain scores 
that were higher than chance levels.
2) By considering chance level performance, it was hypothesized that the PDRT 
and the TOMM would be similar in their sensitivity to identify malingering participants 
while showing specificity in correctly classifying control participants.
3) The third hypothesis was based on participants’ expected performance 
according to established cutoff scores on the PDRT (39 correct) and the TOMM (45 
correct). For the PDRT, it was hypothesized that the UCM would perform lower than the 
cutoff score. The MCM, DCM, and the controls were expected to perform higher than the
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cutoff score. For all three trials on the TOMM, the three malingering groups were 
expected to perform lower than the cutoff score and controls were predicted to perform 
higher than the cutoff score.
4) When using the established cutoff scores, it was hypothesized that the TOMM 
would show better sensitivity and specificity, correctly distinguishing between 
malingering participants and control participants at a higher rate than the PDRT.
5) It was hypothesized that the degree of coaching would influence malingerers’ 
performance on the PDRT, the TOMM, and each of the standard tests. That is, the UCM 
were predicted to obtain fewer correct responses on all the tests than the MCM, DCM, 
and controls. The MCM were expected to respond to a significantly fewer number of 
correct items than the DCM who were expected to perform significantly lower (worse) 
than the control participants.
6) It was predicted that the control participants would obtain higher scores than 
the malingering participants, answering significantly more correct items on the PDRT, 
the TOMM, and all the standard tests.
7) It was further hypothesized that all groups of malingerers would perform worse 
on the Pairing portion of the Incidental Learning task than they would perform on the 
Free Recall portion.
8) A positive correlation was expected between familiarity with head injury 
sequelae and the scores obtained on the PDRT and the TOMM. That is, those participants 
who were more familiar with head injury sequelae were predicted to score higher on the 
two tests than those participants without this familiarity. It was hypothesized that this 
correlation would be highest for the UCM and the MCM.
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9) Regarding the face validity for the measures, it was expected that the majority 
of participants would classify the TOMM as a memory measure. Face validity for the 
PDRT and the standard neuropsychological tests has not been studied. Therefore, no 
specific hypotheses were offered regarding these data.
10) When considering the mean certainty ratings regarding the degree to which 
participants were certain that a test was a malingering measure, it was hypothesized that 
the DCM would be the most certain about their decision regarding the true nature of the 
measures.
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Method
Participants
Ninety-six college students were evenly divided and randomly assigned to one of 
four groups: (a) controls, (b) UCM, (c) MCM, and (d) DCM. The participants (40 men,
56 women, M  Age = 19.58) were recruited from an introductory psychology course at 
The University of Montana and received partial fulfillment of the experimental credit 
requirement for that course as compensation for participating. All participants were 
treated in accordance with the “Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct” 
(American Psychological Association, 1992).
Participants were screened for neurological and substance abuse problems as 
assessed by the medical history questionnaire (see Appendix A). Students who indicated 
a history of neurological and/or substance abuse problems were not included in the 
experiment.
Students were further screened for psychological problems using the Brief 
Symptom Inventory (BSI; see Appendix B). Criteria used to identify the degree of 
psychological distress in the students were obtained from a research study conducted with 
college students (Cochran, 1996). Given that college students tend to endorse many 
symptoms on the BSI (Cochran, 1985), the non-college student norms in the manual were 
deemed inappropriate for this study. Thus, the norms that Cochran (1996) collected on a 
college sample (33 men, 51 women, M age = 27.61, SD 3.72) were used for the present 
study instead of the norms provided in the manual.
The following four groups of students participated in this experiment.
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Controls. Twenty-four college students (Age 18-26, M =  19.33) were randomly 
assigned to the control group and were asked to perform to the best of their ability (see 
Appendix C). Rose et al. (1995, 1998) provided their control participants similar 
instructions.
Uncoached Malingerers (UCM). Another 24 college students (Age 18-28, M  = 
19.54) were randomly assigned to act as UCM, and they read the following scenario (see 
Appendix D). The scenario was modified from the scenarios used by Rose et al. (1995, 
1998) and Tombaugh (1997).
You are about to take some cognitive tests that examine mental abilities such as 
attention, memory, thinking and reasoning skills, and your ability to think quickly. While 
responding to the tests, please pretend that you have experienced brain damage from a car 
accident involving a head-on collision. You hit your head against the windshield and 
were knocked out for 15 minutes. Afterwards, you felt “dazed” so you were hospitalized 
overnight for observation. Because the driver of the other car is at fault, you have decided 
to go to court to get money from the person responsible. During the next few months 
following the accident, the negative effects from your head injury disappear. Your 
lawsuit has not been settled yet, and your lawyer has told you that you may get more 
money if you look like you are still suffering from brain damage.
As you pretend to be this car accident victim, try to respond to each test as a 
patient who is trying to appear brain damaged in order to get money from the lawsuit. 
Thus, your performance on the tests should convince the examiner as well as the people 
involved in deciding the outcome of your lawsuit that you are still suffering from brain 
damage.
These students were not told how to accomplish their task and they did not receive 
information regarding the effects of head injuries. Thus, they represented the uncoached 
manipulation.
Minimally Coached Malingerers (MCM). A group of 24 college students (Age 18- 
32, M =  19.88) was randomly assigned to act as MCM. They received the same 
instructions and scenario as the UCM, but the following clue to make their portrayal of 
brain damage believable was added (see Appendix E).
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In order to convince these individuals, your brain damage must be believable. 
These participants did not receive information about head injury sequelae; however, the 
clue to present a believable symptom picture represented a minimal level of coaching.
Detailed Coached Malingerers (DCM). Another 24 college students (Age 18-25, 
M — 19.58) were randomly assigned to the DCM group. These students received the same 
instructions and scenario as the MCM, but they were also given the following 
information regarding head injury effects (see Appendix F). This information was 
adapted from the scenario that was used for the coached participants in the studies 
conducted by Rose et al. (1995, 1998).
Try to produce the most severe problems that you can without making it too 
obvious to the examiner. Major exaggerations, such as remembering absolutely nothing, 
are easy to detect. If the examiner does not believe that you have any problems you will 
not get any money for your head injury. People who have a head injury often have 
problems paying attention, cannot remember things as well, and do not learn things as 
easily as they did before their injury. They also think a little slower than they used to. 
Keep this in mind when taking the tests. Remember you are to try to mimic the 
performance of persons who are truly brain damaged.
This additional information described common head injury sequelae and emphasized that 
the participants’ presentation must be believable and not obviously faked. This guidance 
represented the detailed-coached manipulation.
In light of.the controversy surrounding coaching studies, the instructions used for 
the present study were limited to information that is widely available and easily accessed. 
Additionally, participants were not told to respond with at least a 50% accuracy rate. The 
PDRT and the TOMM employ a two-alternative, forced-choice paradigm making it 
possible to detect malingerers when their performance drops below the level of chance. 
Thus, informing participants that they should respond above chance levels would have 
invalidated the design of the two-alternative, forced-choice measures.
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Materials
Medical History Questionnaire. The medical history questionnaire was used to 
assess participants’ history of neurological and substance abuse conditions (see Appendix 
A). This questionnaire is a modified version of the questionnaire used by Rose et al. 
(1998).
Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI). The BSI is a 53-item self-report inventory that 
was used to assess psychological distress and symptom patterns in people 
(Administration Manual, Derogatis, 1993). Each item in this brief version of the SCL-90- 
R is rated on a five-point scale of distress, ranging from 0 {not at all) to 4 (extremely). 
Nine primary symptom dimensions and three global indices of psychological distress are 
assessed with the BSI. The inventory was originally normed on psychiatric and medical 
patients and community nonpatient members. As previously discussed, Cochran (1996) 
developed norms for college students, which were used for the present study.
Portland Digit Recognition Test (PDRT). The PDRT is a two-alternative, forced- 
choice test that was administered individually to each participant (Binder, 1990). 
Participants were verbally presented a 5-digit number at the rate of one digit per second. 
After the presentation, they were asked to count backwards from 20. This interpolated 
activity was interrupted after 5 s and then a 3X5 card was presented. The card had two 5- 
digit numbers, one being the target that was previously shown and one serving as the foil. 
The participants were asked to identify which item was shown and feedback was given as 
to whether they were right or wrong. This process occurred for 18 trials and the 
participants were praised if at least 12 of the 18 items were correctly identified. Then the 
examiner informed the participants that the task was going to get more difficult and they
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were to count backwards from 50. This time the participants were not interrupted until a 
15s delay period had occurred. This process was repeated for another 18 trials and the 
same criterion was used to praise the participants. Following the 18 trials with the 15 s 
delay between each trial, participants were informed that the test was going to become 
even more difficult. The delay period was increased from 15 s to 30 s and the participants 
were asked to count backwards from 100 during the 30 s delay period. The test was 
concluded after another 36 trials had been completed. Items presented during the 5 s and 
15 s delay trials were designated the “easy” items and the items presented during the 30 s 
delay were designated the “hard” items. Consequently, 36 “easy” and 36 “hard” items 
were presented prior to concluding the test. Even though items were designated “easy” 
and “hard”, the probability of getting the correct answer stayed constant for all items. 
That is, when participants were presented with one target and one foil, they had a 50% 
chance of correctly responding to each two-alternative item. The correct answer was 
located on top of the response card 50% of the time and on bottom the other 50% of the 
time.
Test o f  Memory Malingering (TOMM). The TOMM is also a two-alternative, 
forced-choice malingering test that was administered individually to each participant 
(Tombaugh, 1997). The test consisted of two learning trials and a delayed retention trial. 
Each learning trial included the same 50 line-drawn pictures of common objects. The 
drawings were presented at the rate of 1 drawing every 3 s and the order of picture 
presentation was different for the trials. A two-choice panel containing a target and a foil 
followed each learning trial and participants were asked to identify the drawing 
previously shown. A different foil was presented in a counterbalanced order for the trials.
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A score of 0 to 50 was recorded following each trial and feedback was provided for every 
item. After a 15 min delay period that was filled with standard tests, retention was 
assessed.
Trail Making Test (TMT) Parts A and B. The TMT was administered during the 
15 min delay period between Trial 2 and the retention trial for the TOMM (Reitan & 
Davison, 1974). Part A consisted of 25 circles printed on a piece of paper. A number 
from 1 to 25 was printed in the center of each circle. The participants were given 
instructions to connect the circles with a pencil as quickly as possible, beginning with the 
number 1 and working in a numerical sequence until they reached the number 25. Part B 
consisted of 25 circles that were numbered from 1 to 13 and lettered A to L. Participants 
were instructed to connect the circles as quickly as possible in sequence, alternating 
between numbers and letters (i.e., 1 to A, A to 2, 2 to B, B to 3, etc.). Performance was 
timed on both parts of the TMT. The examiner pointed out any mistakes that were made 
and the participants were asked to proceed from the point where the mistake occurred, 
correcting the error based on the feedback that was provided by the examiner. The scores 
for Part A and Part B were the number of seconds required to complete the tasks. The 
number of mistakes was not directly counted; however, mistakes increased the 
performance time, which affected the final score.
Digit Symbol Coding Subtest. The Digit Symbol Coding subtest from the Third 
Edition of the WAIS (WAIS-III) was also administered during the 15 min delay period 
for the TOMM (The Psychological Corporation, 1997). This subtest consisted of seven 
practice boxes and 133 test boxes. Each box contained a number in the upper portion and 
an empty space in the lower portion. On the same sheet of paper was a key that had nine
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boxes numbered 1 through 9. Each number in the key was paired with a specific symbol. 
The examiner demonstrated the first few practice items and instructed the participants to 
complete the practice items by drawing the symbol that was paired with the number in 
the key. Once it was clear that the participants understood the task, they were instructed 
to fill in the test items without skipping any boxes while they worked. They were allowed 
120 s to match as many numbers and symbols as possible. The score on this test was the 
total of correctly matched symbols and numbers.
Digit Symbol Incidental Learning Task. The Digit Symbol Coding subtest from 
the WAIS-III incorporates an additional task called the Digit Symbol Incidental Learning 
task (The Psychological Corporation, 1997). This task was administered during the 15 
min delay period for the TOMM. The Pairing portion of the task consisted of two sets of 
nine boxes. Each set of boxes had a number in the upper portion of the boxes, ranging 
from 1 to 9. Participants were instructed to fill in the symbols that matched the given 
numbers. The symbol and number pairs were the same ones that the participants learned 
during the Digit Symbol Coding subtest; however, the key was not shown for the 
Incidental Learning task. Thus, this task was a measure of participants’ immediate ability 
to remember the appropriate matches. Additionally, the Free Recall portion of the 
Incidental Learning task was administered. Participants were instructed to write down all 
the symbols they remembered in any order they chose. The score for the Pairing portion 
of the task was the total of correctly matched numbers and symbols, and the score for the 
Free Recall portion was the total of correctly recalled symbols. Performance was not 
timed during any portion of the Incidental Learning task.
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No known studies exist using the Incidental Learning task to examine test 
performance in malingerers. However, Hart, Kwentus, Wade, and Hamer (1987) 
administered the Incidental Learning task from the WAIS to healthy older adults, older 
adults experiencing depression, and older adults diagnosed with mild dementia. The 
researchers found that the performance of the people with depression was significantly 
lower than the healthy adults’ performance on the Pairing portion of the task, with no 
significant differences found between the two groups for the Free Recall task. 
Furthermore, the patients with dementia had significantly lower scores than the other two 
groups, obtaining few correct responses on both the Pairing and Free Recall portions of 
the task.
Post-Experimental Questionnaire 1 (PEQ1). All participants completed the PEQ1 
(see Appendix G). Responses to the initial two items on the PEQ1 were used to determine 
the data that were included in the analyses. For the first item, participants were asked to 
paraphrase their instructions. Two raters determined whether participants’ written 
responses accurately reflected an understanding of their task. In order to establish the 
participants’ effort in following their instructions, a Likert-type item ranging from 1 
(<didn’t try at all) to 5 {tried very hard) was also included. Any data collected from 
participants indicating they correctly understood their instructions and tried at least 
moderately hard (i.e., a score of “3” on a 5-point Likert-type item) to follow the 
instructions were considered in the analyses.
Another Likert-type item, ranging from 1 {not at all successful) to 5 {very 
successful), was included to determine how successful the participants felt they were in 
accomplishing their task. Responses to a “Yes/No” question were used to assess whether
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the participants believed they were successful in keeping the examiner from knowing 
what instructions they were following (i.e., control, UCM, MCM, and DCM). The 
participants were also asked to indicate their familiarity with head injury sequelae using a 
Likert-type item ranging from 1 {not at all familiar) to 5 {very familiar).
The last seven items on the PEQ1 were used to assess the face validity of the 
tests. Participants were asked to note their beliefs regarding the purpose of each test. 
Responses were categorized for the tests and were agreed upon by two independent raters 
(see Results section for the categories).
Post-Experimental Questionnaire 2 (PEQ2). An additional questionnaire was 
included to further assess the face validity of the seven tests (see Appendix H). This 
questionnaire contained instructions informing the participants that some of the tests were 
designed to measure feigned brain damage, while others are common tests used to assess 
cognitive abilities. Participants were asked to put a check by the tests that they believed 
were designed to evaluate feigned brain damage. Then they were asked to indicate the 
certainty of their beliefs on a Likert-type item ranging from 1 {not at all certain) to 5 
{very certain). As previously reviewed, participants’ initial beliefs regarding the purpose 
of each test were assessed using the PEQ1 described above. The PEQ2 was not provided 
to participants until after they sealed the PEQ1 in an envelope. Consequently, their initial 
responses were not contaminated by this additional information about the true intent of 
some of the tests.
Procedure
Prior to participating, students signed the informed consent form (see Appendix 
I). They were randomly assigned to groups according to the following procedure. One
Malingering and Coaching 38
envelope containing an instruction sheet and a second envelope containing the PEQ1 
were prepared for each participant. An identification number was assigned to both 
envelopes and to all data for each individual. This number preserved the participants’ 
anonymity and aided the examiners in organizing the data sheets. Each participant was 
tested individually.
The participants completed the BSI and the demographic sheet (age, completed 
years of education, and gender). Then they received a sealed envelope containing 
instructions representing one of the four different types of groups: (a) controls, (b) UCM, 
(c) MCM, and (d) DCM (see Appendixes C, D, E and F respectively). The instructions 
for the three malingering groups informed the participants that they would receive two 
additional credits if they successfully convinced the examiner that they had suffered a 
brain injury. In actuality, all participants received the additional credits in return for their 
participation. Given that students in the Psychology 100 courses are required to complete 
an experimental component, these additional credits provided an incentive for the 
malingering participants to follow their instructions. Incentives to malinger in the real 
world often include large monetary awards; therefore, it is important to provide some 
form of incentive in simulation studies.
A strict protocol was followed in order to keep the examiners blind to the 
individual conditions. For example, while the participants were reading the instructions, 
the examiner was not in the room. Each participant was instructed verbally as well as in 
writing to keep his or her group membership hidden at all times during the experiment. 
All participants were given 7 min to think about their instructions and were asked to seal
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them in the envelope when they were finished reading them. Following the 7 min time 
period, the examiner returned to the examination room to proceed with the experiment.
The author or a research assistant administered the PDRT and the TOMM in 
counterbalanced order to each participant. The examiners were trained in test 
administration and followed a detailed protocol. During the 15 min delay period between 
Trial 2 and the retention trial for the TOMM, participants completed the TMT Parts A 
and B, followed by the Digit Symbol Coding subtest, and finally the Incidental Learning 
task. After completing all the measures, the participants received the PEQ1 in another 
sealed envelope (see Appendix G). While the participants were filling out this 
questionnaire, the examiner was not in the examination room. This provided further 
protection against the examiner discovering the participants’ group membership as they 
paraphrased their instructions on this questionnaire. After completing the questionnaire, 
participants sealed it in the envelope and called the examiner into the room. The 
participants were then given the PEQ2 (see Appendix H), which was followed by a 
debriefing procedure (see Appendix J). Finally, participants were informed that they were 
being compensated for their efforts by receiving two additional experimental credits. The 
entire experimental session lasted an average of 2 hours.
Data Preparation and Analyses
A between-subjects’ experiment was designed. The data analysis phase included 
20 separate one-way anovas. In order to decrease the probability of making a Type I 
error, significant levels for anovas were corrected according to the Bonferroni using the 
following formula: .05 divided by the number of anovas. Thus, the individual alpha level 
used for all anovas was set to .001. The Tukey honestly significant difference comparison
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test was used to further examine significant findings. The conventional .05 level of 
significance was utilized for post hoc analyses once significance had been initially 
achieved with the more stringent alpha level.
For the analyses in this experiment, there were 24 students in each of the four 
groups, for a total sample size of 96 participants. For this study, power exceeded .99 and 
the effect size was equal to 5.39. All data were analyzed using the Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 10.0 (SPSS Inc., 1999).
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Results
Five participants in the malingering groups did not indicate trying at least 
moderately hard (i.e., rating of “3”) to follow their instructions. Additionally, 2 
participants in the malingering groups and 1 control participant did not indicate the 
required level of understanding regarding their instructions. These data were discarded 
and replaced by 8 additional participants whose effort was at the appropriate level and 
understanding of instructions was adequate.
Table 1 shows the norms obtained by Cochran (1996) as well as the percentage of 
participants in the present study who were elevated on the BSI. As previously reviewed, 
Cochran (1996) found that college students tend to have elevated scores on the BSI.
thTherefore, the 95 percentile from that study was used as the cutoff for the present
i .L
study’s data. That is, students who fell at or above the 95 percentile were considered to 
have scores indicative of a significant degree of psychological distress. Using those 
criteria for the present study, 39 of 96 (41%) participants showed elevated scores on the 
BSI (i.e., elevations on at least 2 primary scales and/or an elevated Global Severity 
Index). Percentages of participants who were elevated on each of the scales are as 
follows: Somatization (17%), Interpersonal Sensitivity (27%), Obsessive-Compulsive 
(21%), Depression (11%), Anxiety (19%), Hostility (19%), Paranoid Ideation (22%), 
Phobic Anxiety (1%), Psychoticism (19%), and Global Severity Index (27%).
Statistical analyses for controls, DCM, MCM, and UCM whose scores were 
at/above or below the cutoff on the BSI are shown in Appendixes K, L, M, and N 
respectively. Independent samples t-tests were conducted to compare performance
Malingering and Coaching 42
Table 1
College Student Norms and Percentage o f  Participants Elevated on the Brief Symptom 
Inventory (BSI)
Normsa Normsa
Present15
Study
Present15
Study
BSI Scales M(SD)
95th
Percentile
% o f  
Participants 
Elevated on 
1 Scale
% o f  
Participants 
Elevated on 
At Least 2 
Scales and/or 
GSI
Somatization .18 (.23) .57 5 17
Interpersonal
Sensitivity
.39 (.50) 1.00 3 27
Obsessive-Compulsive .52 (.46) 1.33 3 21
Depression .29 (.42) 1.17 0 11
Anxiety .33 (.38) .83 1 19
Hostility .35 (.35) 1.00 2 19
Paranoid Ideation .29 (.44) 1.00 1 22
Phobic Anxiety .19 (.43) 1.2 0 1
Psychoticism .22 (.42) .80 1 19
Global Severity 
Index (GSI)
.30 (.28) .66 0 27
Note. aMeans, standard deviations, and the 95l percentile normative data were gathered 
by Cochran (1996). Percentages for current study include participants who were at or 
above the 95th percentile.
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between participants with and without elevations on the BSI. No significant differences 
occurred on any of the measures when comparing participants whose BSI was above 
cutoff with participants whose BSI was below cutoff. Thus, participants were included in 
the analyses regardless of their score on the BSI.
Demographic Information
Table 2 contains the demographic information for the four groups of participants. 
Chi-square showed no significant gender differences, X 2 (3, N =  96) = 3.09,p  = .379.
Group differences for age and education were analyzed by two separate anovas. No 
significant differences occurred for Age, F(3, 92) = .21,/? = .887 or for years of education 
F(3, 92) = .86,/? = .465.
Table 2
Demographic Information for All Participants
Demographics
Controls
Group
DCM MCM UCM
X 2
or F
P
Gender Men 11 13 8 8 3.09* .379
Women 13 11 16 16
Age M 19.33 19.58 19.88 19.54 (3, 92)+ .887
(SD) (1.79) (1.79) (3.40) (2.11) .21
Completed M 12.38 12.67 12.38 12.29 (3, 92)+ .465
Years of Ed (SD) (.71) (1.09) (.92) (.69) .86
Note. No significant gender differences exist. No significant differences occurred for age 
or years of education.*Chi-square. +F-Value.
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Malingering Tests
Test o f  Memory Malingering (TOMM). The means and standard deviations for the 
number of correctly answered items on the TOMM for all three trials are presented in 
Table 3. Three separate one-way anovas identified significant group differences on Trial 
1, F(3, 92) = 19.76,/? = .000, Trial 2, F(3, 92) = 13.42,/? = .000, and the Retention trial, 
F(3, 92) = 13.66,p  = .000. Post hoc analysis using the Tukey honestly significant 
difference comparison indicated that the control group answered significantly more 
items correctly on all trials for the TOMM than the three malingering groups. The three 
malingering groups did not differ significantly from one another in their performance on 
any of the TOMM trials.
Table 3
Mean Number o f  Correct Responses on the TOMM
Group
TOMM 
Trial 1
Test
TOMM 
Trial 2
TOMM 
Retention Trial
M SD M SD M SD
Controls 49.38a .88 49.96a .20 50.00a .00
DCM 33.25b 9.95 35.58b 11.10 35.79b 11.73
MCM 30 .12b 10.37 31.38b 12.15 29.54b 13.34
UCM 34.13b 12.37 34.79b 14.60 35.04b 14.82
Note. Means that do not share subscripts differ at p <  .05 in the Tukey honestly 
significant difference comparison.
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Portland Digit Recognition Test (PDRT): Total Score. Table 4 shows the means 
and standard deviations for the total number of correctly answered items on the PDRT. 
Anova identified significant group differences on the PDRT Total Score, F(3, 92) = 
39.20,/? =.000. Post hoc analysis using the Tukey honestly significant difference 
comparison showed that the control group answered significantly more items correctly 
than the three malingering groups. The three malingering groups did not differ 
significantly from one another on the PDRT.
Table 4
Mean Number o f  Correct Responses on the PDRT
Test
PDRT 
Total Score
Group M SD
Controls 64.46a 3.97
DCM 41.63b 11.18
MCM 37.04b 10.70
UCM 40.13b 11.50
Note. Means that do not share subscripts differ at p <  .05 in the Tukey honestly 
significant difference comparison.
Classification Rates Using the Malingering Tests
All three groups of malingering participants were combined into a single group of 
malingerers. The reason for creating one group of malingerers was that in clinical 
practice the goal is to be able to identify whether patients are malingering or whether they
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have bona fide deficits, regardless of whether the malingerers were coached for the 
assessment process. In order to classify students as a malingering or a control participant, 
the following rules were applied to the PDRT and the TOMM. Each participant’s 
performance was compared to chance levels and to established cutoff scores for both 
tests. For the PDRT Total Score, a score of 36 represents chance level performance and a 
score of 39 represents cutoff score performance. For the TOMM, a score of 25 on Trial 2 
represents chance level performance and a score of 45 on Trial 2 represents cutoff score 
performance. Thus, participants who scored below chance levels or cutoff scores for the 
PDRT and the TOMM were classified as malingering.
Figure 1 shows the classification rates for the PDRT and the TOMM according to 
participants’ chance level performance. Correlated Proportions analysis was conducted to 
determine the amount of participants who were correctly classified by only the PDRT or 
the TOMM, by both tests, and by none of the two tests (see Appendix O). The analysis 
showed that the PDRT correctly classified a significantly larger percentage of 
malingering participants compared to the TOMM (z = 2.31,/? = .02, two-tailed). On the 
PDRT, 27 of 72 (38%) malingering participants were correctly classified. On the TOMM, 
19 of 72 (26%) malingering participants were correctly classified. All control participants 
were correctly classified by both tests (100% respectively). Overall, these findings show 
that while the PDRT classified significantly more malingering participants, neither test is 
effective at classifying participants when using chance level criterion (38% vs. 26% 
respectively).
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Figure 1
100 100
■  P D R T  
H T O M M
Ma l i n g e r e r s  Co n t r o l s
Test
Percent of Participants Correctly Classified by the TOMM and PDRT Based on
Chance Level Performance
Note. *p < .05.
Figure 2 shows that classification rates for the PDRT and the TOMM according to 
participants’ cutoff score performance. Again, Correlated Proportions analysis was 
conducted to determine the amount of participants who were correctly classified by only 
the PDRT or the TOMM, by both tests, and by none of the two tests (see Appendix O). 
The analysis showed that the TOMM correctly classified a significantly larger percentage 
of participants than the PDRT (z = 3.41, p  = .001, two-tailed). On the PDRT, 35 of 72 
(49%) malingering students were correctly classified. On the TOMM, 51 of 72 (71%) 
malingering participants were correctly classified. Both tests correctly identified all 
control participants according to cutoff score performance (100% respectively). These 
findings show that when using cutoff scores the TOMM classified significantly more
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malingering participants than the PDRT, regardless of level of coaching (71% vs. 49% 
respectively).
Figure 2
100 100
M a l i n g e r e r s  C o n t r o l s
Test
Percent of Participants Correctly Classified by the TOMM and PDRT Based on 
Established Cutoff Score Performance
Note. *p < .05.
Standard Tests
Trail Making Test (TMT): Parts A and B. Table 5 shows the means and standard 
deviations for the total amount of seconds required for participants to complete each part 
of the TMT. Two one-way anovas indicated significant group differences on Part A, F(3, 
92) = 8.799p =  .000 and on Part B, F(3, 92) = 8.30,p  = .000. Post hoc analysis using the 
Tukey honestly significant difference comparison indicated that the control group showed 
significantly better performance than the malingering groups, completing both parts of
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the TMT at a quicker speed. The three malingering groups did not differ significantly 
from one another in their performance on either part of the TMT.
Table 5
Mean Number o f  Seconds Participants Required to Complete the Trails Making Test 
Parts A and B
Group
Trails
A
Test
Trails
B
M SD M SD
Controls 17.63a 4.51 42.75a 10.53
DCM 38.33b 19.80 70.92b 34.79
MCM 54.42b 40.93 92.92b 52.04
UCM 39.08b 20.08 74.63b 30.65
Note. Means in the same column that do not share subscripts differ at/? < .05 in the 
Tukey honestly significant difference comparison.
Digit Symbol Coding Subtest. The means and standard deviations for the number 
of correctly answered items on the Digit Symbol Coding subtest are presented in Table 6. 
Anova revealed significant group differences on the subtest, F(3, 92) = 7.81,/? = .000. 
Post hoc analysis using the Tukey honestly significant difference comparison showed that 
the control group answered significantly more items correctly when compared to all 
malingering groups. No significant differences occurred among the three malingering 
groups on the test.
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Table 6
Mean Number o f  Correct Responses on the Digit Symbol Coding and Incidental Learning 
Pairing and Free Recall Tasks
Group
Digit Symbol 
Coding
Test
Incidental Learning 
Pairing
Incidental Learning 
Free Recall
M SD M SD M SD
Controls 84.17a 11.55 15.21a 3.19 8.04a 1.04
DCM 63.79b 21.49 10.50b 4.38 6.50bc 1.35
MCM 57.71b 25.13 8.79b 5.16 5.88b 2.29
UCM 65.67b 19.28 11.50b 5.36 7.21 ac 1.59
Note. Means in the same column that do not share subscripts differ at p  < .05 in the 
Tukey honestly significant difference comparison.
Digit Symbol Incidental Learning Task. The means and standard deviations for 
the number of correctly answered items for the Pairing portion and Free Recall portion of 
the test are also presented in Table 6. A one-way anova revealed significant group 
differences on the Pairing portion, F(3, 92) = 8.35,/? = .000. Tukey honestly significant 
difference comparison indicated that the control group answered significantly more items 
correctly for the Pairing portion of the task than the three malingering groups. The three 
malingering groups did not differ significantly from one another in their performance on 
the Pairing portion of the Incidental Learning task. Anova showed significant group 
differences on the Free Recall portion, F(3, 92) = 7.82,/? = .000. For the Free Recall 
portion, post hoc analysis using the Tukey procedure showed that the MCM group 
recalled significantly fewer items correctly than the UCM and the controls. Additionally,
Malingering and Coaching 51
the DCM recalled significantly fewer items correctly than the controls. There were no 
other significant differences among the four groups. The results for the Free Recall 
portion show that participants who received no coaching performed similar to control 
participants and people who received detailed coaching. Furthermore, participants 
without coaching performed significantly better than people who received minimal levels 
of coaching.
Figure 3 shows the percentage of correct responses that participants in each of the 
groups achieved on the Incidental Learning task Pairing and Free Recall portions. Paired 
samples t-tests were calculated for the four groups. These results indicated that 
participants’ performance on the Pairing portion was significantly lower than their Free 
Recall performance for the UCM, t(23) = -3.89,p  = .001 (two-tailed), the MCM, /(23) = 
-4.96, p  = .000 (two-tailed), the DCM, ^(23) = -3.85,p  = .001 (two-tailed), and controls, 
^(23) = -2.28, p  = .032. These results show that regardless of whether participants are 
asked to respond honestly or to feign brain damage, they score worse on the Pairing task 
than they perform on the Free Recall task.
Questionnaire Responses
First Post-Experimental Questionnaire (PEQ1). The means and standard 
deviations for effort and success ratings are presented in Table 7. These ratings were 
analyzed by two separate one-way anovas. Significant group differences occurred for 
effort, F(3, 92) = 6.07,p  = .001 and for success ratings, F(3, 92) = 35.40, p  = .000. The 
Tukey honestly significant difference comparison revealed that the control participants 
rated their effort and their success at following their instructions as significantly better 
than the three malingering groups. These differences in ratings show that control
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Figure 3
■ P a i r i n g  
I F r e e R e c a l
Control DCM MCM UCM 
Group
Performance on the Incidental Learning Task Pairing and Free Recall Portions
Note. Two-tailed paired samples t-tests showed significant differences between 
Pairing and Free Recall performance for each group, *p < .05.
participants felt the effort they put forth in following their instructions was greater than 
the effort reported by malingering participants. Additionally, these differences show that, 
compared to malingering participants, control participants felt more successful at 
accomplishing their experimental task. No significant differences occurred among the 
three malingering groups for effort or success ratings.
Malingering and Coaching 53
Table 7
Mean Effort and Success Ratings to Follow Instructions
Group
Effort
Ratings
Success
M SD M SD
Controls 4.75a .60 4.75a .44
DCM 4.13b .74 2.83b .96
MCM 4.10b .75 3.10b .75
UCM 3.92b .78 2.63b .92
Note. Ratings were made on a 5-point scale according to participants’ perceived effort 
(1 = didn’t try at all, 5 = tried very hard) and success (1 = not at all successful, 5 = very 
successful). Means in the same column that do not share subscripts differ at p <  .05 in the 
Tukey honestly significant difference comparison.
%
Responses to a “Yes/No” question on the PEQ1 were used to assess whether the 
participants believed they were successful in keeping the examiner from knowing what 
instructions they were following (i.e., controls, DCM, MCM, and UCM). Chi-square 
showed no significant differences among the four groups, X 2 (3, N  = 96) = 4.02,p  =
.259. Figure 4 shows that 96% of the control participants, 92% of the DCM, 79% of the 
MCM, and 92% of the UCM felt they were successful in keeping their group membership 
hidden.
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Figure 4
8 60
a> 40
Controls DCM MCM
Group
UCM
Percent of Participants Believing They Were Successful at Hiding Their Group 
Membership
Note. Chi-square showed no significant differences among the four groups.
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, as shown in Table 8, indicated no significant 
correlation between familiarity with head injuries and participants’ scores on the PDRT 
Total Score. These results were found for the UCM (r = -A9, p  = .363), the MCM (r = 
.19, p  = .369), the DCM (r = -A5, p = .484), and the controls (r = -.02,p  = .935). 
Familiarity with head injuries and participants’ scores on Trial 2 for the TOMM were 
also not significantly correlated for the UCM (r = -.20,p  = .356), the MCM (r = -.03,p  = 
.899), the DCM (r= .03,p  = .900), and the controls (r = .21,/? = .316).
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Table 8
Correlation Coefficients Between Familiarity With Head Injury(HI) and Performance on 
the TOMM and the PDRT
Familiarity 
With HI P
TOMM
Controls (n = 24) 
.21 .316
Trial 2
PDRT -.02 .935
Total Score
Familiarity 
With HI P
TOMM
DCM (n = 24) 
.03 .900
Trial 2
PDRT -.15 .484
Total Score
Familiarity 
With HI P
TOMM
MCM (n = 24) 
-.03 .899
Trial 2
PDRT .19 .369
Total Score
Familiarity 
With HI P
TOMM
UCM (n = 24) 
-.20 .356
Trial 2
PDRT -.19 .363
Total Score
Note. No significant correlations occurred between familiarity with head injury and test 
performance on the TOMM and PDRT.
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Seven items on the PEQ1 were examined to determine the face validity of the 
measures. All four groups of participants were combined for the analyses on this portion 
of the PEQ1 because the goal was to determine participants’ beliefs regarding the 
purpose of each test, regardless of what instructions they received. That is, the primary 
question was whether the administered measures have good face validity as viewed by all 
people who take the tests.
The participants’ responses were categorized for each test and agreed upon by two 
raters. The following categories were created: (a) Memory, (b) Higher Cognitive Skills, 
(c) Emotional Status, (d) Motor/Coordination, (e) Attention, (f) Memory and Attention, 
(g) Memory and Higher Cognitive, (h) Memory and Motor, (f) Don’t Know/Don’t 
Remember, and (g) Other. Percentages are shown in Table 9 for the various categories 
endorsed for the tests. The majority of participants viewed the TOMM (94%), the PDRT 
(84%), and the Pairing portion of the Incidental Learning task (79%) as measuring some 
aspect of memory. Additionally, the TMT Part A (79%) and Part B (63%) and the Digit 
Symbol Coding subtest (51 %) were most commonly viewed as tests used to measure 
higher cognitive skills (e.g., speed of information processing, association, thinking and 
reasoning, etc.). Interestingly, 48% of the participants believed the Digit Symbol Coding 
subtest was measuring some aspect of memory. Finally, the BSI was most commonly 
identified as a questionnaire that is administered to measure emotional status (75%).
These percentages represent participants’ beliefs regarding the nature of the tests 
prior to receiving information that some of the tests may be malingering measures. The 
responses show that participants are generally accurate in identifying the nature of the 
standardized neuropsychological tests. Additionally, the TOMM and the PDRT have
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good face validity as memory measures. Furthermore, with the exception of one 
individual who classified the BSI as a malingering measure (Other category), no response 
indicated that a test was designed to detect malingering.
Table 9
Percentage o f  Participants Endorsing the Various Categories fo r  Each Test on the PEQ1
Test
TOMM PDRT Trails A Trails B Dig Cod IL Pair BSI
Category
Memory 92 69 11 11 42 73 5
Higher
Cognitive
4 7 76 58 46 17 2
Emotional
Status
0 0 0 0 0 0 75
Motor 0 0 4 3 2 0 0
Attention 2 8 2 19 2 1 0
Memory/
Attention
0 14 0 1 1 0 0
Memory/
Higher
Cognitive
2 1 3 5 5 6 0
Memory/
Motor
0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Don’t Know/ 
Don’t 
Remember
0 0 3 2 2 3 13
Other 0 1 0 0 0 0 5
Note, n = 96 for each test except for Trails A in which n = 95.
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Second Post-Experimental Questionnaire (PEQ2). As previously described, all 
four groups of participants were also combined for the analyses on the PEQ2. The 
primary issue was to determine which tests were viewed as malingering measures, 
regardless of participants’ instructions. Chi-square showed that the following tests were 
endorsed as malingering measures at significantly higher rates than would be expected by 
chance: the TOMM, X 2 (1, N =  96) = 40.04,p  = .000, the TMT Part A , X 2( \ , N  = 96) =
8.17,p  = .004, the TMT Part B, X 2(l, N =  96) = 9.38,p  = .002, and the Digit Symbol 
Coding subtest, X 2 (1 , N=  96) = 9.38, p  = .002. Chi-square also indicated that the 
endorsement rates were not significant for the PDRT, X 2 (1, N=  96) = 2.67, p  = .102 and 
the Incidental Learning Pairing portion, X 2 ( \ , N =  96) = 3.38,/? = .066. The percentage 
of people who believed the BSI was not a malingering measure was statistically 
significant, X 2( \ , N  = 96) = 12.04,p  = .001. Table 10 shows the percentage of
participants who classified each test as a malingering measure after receiving instructions 
that some tests were designed to detect malingering (see Appendix H for specific 
instructions). Overall, these findings indicate that participants viewed the TOMM (82%), 
TMT Parts A (65%) and B (66%), and Digit Symbol Coding (66%) as malingering 
measures. It appears the participants were just as likely to endorse the PDRT (58%) and 
the Pairing portion (59%) as malingering tests as they were to not endorse them. Finally, 
the majority of participants believed the BSI is definitely not a malingering test (68%). 
Thus, the TOMM was identified as a malingering test more than any of the other 
measures. However, three of the standardized tests were also viewed as malingering 
measures. In addition, all standard tests were viewed as malingering tests by over half of
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the participants and a personality questionnaire was also thought to be a malingering test 
by approximately one third of the participants. Overall, these results indicate that college 
students are poor at identifying whether a measure was designed to identify malingering 
after receiving a clue that some tests were indeed malingering tests.
Table 10
Percentage o f  Participants Identifying a Test as a Malingering Test
Test
% Yes % No P
TOMM 82 18 40.04 .000
PDRT 58 42 2.67 .102
Trails A 65 35 8.1-7 .004
Trails B 66 34 9.38 .002
Dig Symbol 
Coding
66 34 9.38 .002
IL Pairing 59 41 3.38 .066
BSI 32 68 12.04 .001
Note, p  < .05.
Table 11 indicates the mean certainty ratings and standard deviations for each test 
that participants identified as a malingering measure. For the following analyses, the four 
groups were not collapsed. Each group was examined separately in order to determine if 
the additional information provided to the DCM helped those participants feel more 
certain about their beliefs regarding the purpose of each test. Seven separate one-way 
anovas identified no significant group differences for mean certainty ratings on the
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TOMM, F(3, 75) = 1.24, p  = .303, PDRT, F(3, 52) = .02, p  = .995, Trails A, F(3, 58) = 
.19,p  = .507, Trails B, F(3, 59) = .80,p  = .499, Digit Symbol Coding, F(3, 59) = 1.73, jt?
= .170, Incidental Learning Pairing, F(3, 53) = .91, p  = .413, and the BSI, F(3, 27) =
2.25,p  = .106.
Table 11
Certainty Ratings for Each Test Identified as a Malingering Measure
Test
Controls DCM
Group
MCM UCM
F PM
(SD)
M
(SD)
M
(SD)
M
(SD)
TOMM 3.61 3.05 3.55 3.18 (3, 75) .303
(1.20) (1.13) (.94) (1.05) 1.24
PDRT 3.31 3.33 3.27 3.23 (3, 52) .995
(.95) (1.44) (1.03) (1.01) .02
Trails A 3.43 3.33 3.13 2.90 (3, 58) .507
(.94) (.98) (1.51) (.83) .79
Trails B 3.33 3.23 2.82 3.07 (3, 59) .499
(1.14) (.73) (1.13) (.96) .80
Dig Symbol 3.36 3.00 3.13 2.50 (3, 59) .170
Coding (.84) (1.00) (1.45) (1.04) 1.73
IL Pairing 3.14 2.50 3.00 2.75 (3, 53) .413
(.86) (.85) (1.17) (1.00) .97
BSI 3.25 2.60 1.75 2.40 (3, 27) .106
(.89) (1.67) (.89) (1.26) 2.25
Note. Ratings were made on a 5-point scale according to participants’ certainty regarding 
whether the test was a malingering measure (1 = not at all certain, 5 = very certain). 
Means for the four groups are not significantly different for any of the tests.
Malingering and Coaching 61
Discussion
One goal for the present study was to compare the PDRT and the TOMM in their 
ability to correctly distinguish between controls and three groups of simulated 
malingerers differentiated by the amount of coaching they received. These comparisons 
were based on participants’ chance level and cutoff score performance on the two tests.
Results showed partial support for the hypothesis regarding chance level 
performance among the four groups. All four groups of participants scored above chance 
level on both the PDRT and the TOMM. These results are consistent with many 
researchers’ findings: malingerers do not consistently perform below chance level on 
forced-choice tests (For a review see Binder, 1993; Binder & Willis, 1991; Hiscock et al., 
1994; Iverson et al., 1991, Tombaugh, 1997). Contrary to the hypothesized results, the 
PDRT was more effective than the TOMM at correctly classifying malingering 
participants when chance level performance was considered, although both tests achieved 
very low classification rates for malingering participants. Both tests were equally 
effective at accurately classifying control participants.
Consistent with the hypothesis, the TOMM correctly classified a significantly 
larger percentage of malingering participants compared to the PDRT when the cutoff 
scores were used. Both tests correctly identified all control participants when using cutoff 
scores. Tombaugh (1997) demonstrated that using the established cutoff score on the 
TOMM correctly classified 91% of all patients, 99.9% of the cognitively intact 
volunteers, and 100% of the malingering participants (all received coaching). Rees et al. 
(1998) also found high classification rates for participants when using the cutoff score.
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Interestingly, classification rates were lower for the malingerers in the present study 
when using the TOMM (71%).
As hypothesized, all three groups of malingerers scored below the established 
cutoff score and the control group scored above the cutoff score on the three TOMM 
trials. These data are consistent with Tombaugh (1997) and Rees et al. (1998) studies.
The results showed partial support for the hypothesis that all groups, except the UCM, 
would perform higher than the cutoff score on the PDRT. The MCM group was the only 
group whose mean performance was lower than the established cutoff score for the 
PDRT. However, for all three malingering groups, test performance was within one to 
two points of the cutoff score. Rose et al. (1998) reported that their uncoached 
malingerers were several points below the cutoff score on the PDRT whereas their 
coached malingerers were within one point of the cutoff score. The head injury patients 
and control participants scored well above the cutoff score on the PDRT in the Rose et al. 
(1998) study.
Compared to the findings from the current study, Bianchini, Mathias, Greve, 
Houston, and Crouch (2001) demonstrated higher classification rates when using the 
PDRT and cutoff score performance. These researchers classified two groups of TBI 
patients: one group of probable malingerers (i.e., patients in which malingering was very 
likely) and one group of people who were unlikely to be malingering (i.e., patients who 
were not seeking compensation). All of the non-malingerers and 77% of the probable 
malingerers were classified by comparing the patients’ performance on the PDRT to the 
established cutoff score. These differences in classification rates between the present 
study and Bianchini et al.’s (2001) study appear to be due to the fact that many of the
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simulated malingerers in this study performed better than expected, achieving scores 
above the cutoff score on the PDRT. Thus, a number of the malingerers escaped 
detection.
Overall, the findings support previous research showing that using chance level 
performance is not as effective as using cutoff score performance when classifying 
malingering participants (Bianchini et al., 2001; Rees et al., 1998; Tombaugh, 1997).
Less than 40% of the malingering participants in the present study were identified when 
using chance level performance on both tests. Another issue previously reviewed is the 
fact that people often do not score lower than chance level on these tests (Binder, 1993; 
Binder & Willis, 1991; Hiscock et al., 1994; Iverson et al., 1991, Tombaugh, 1997).
Thus, if researchers rely on chance level performance as a method for detecting 
malingerers, many individuals will escape detection.
Considering these results and previous research, the primary advantages that the 
TOMM has over the PDRT are brief administration time, better ability to detect 
malingerers using cutoff scores, and the fact that patients with severe deficits tend to do 
well on the TOMM (distinguishing them from malingerers). As previously reviewed, the 
PDRT has several notable shortcomings. First, dedicating approximately 1 hr simply to 
rule out malingering is not feasible given that neuropsychological evaluations are time 
consuming and expensive. Moreover, for many patients, the PDRT is relatively easy, 
which contributes to their boredom and annoyance with the assessment process (Lezak, 
1995). At times the PDRT is difficult for some patients with bona-fide deficits, increasing 
the possibility that they will be inaccurately identified as malingerers (Binder & Willis, 
1991). Thus, it seems that administering the TOMM, considering test patterns on
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standard tests, and using clinical judgment would be beneficial techniques for detecting 
malingering signatures.
An additional goal was to examine in a thorough and systematic manner the 
impact that different levels of coaching have on test performance. Although malingering 
has been widely studied for decades, no studies have been published that examine 
coaching to the extent accomplished in the present study. Many researchers have 
demonstrated that coaching participants on the effects of head injury helps those 
participants perform better than when they do not receive coaching (Hall & Parker, 1996; 
Hiscock et al., 1994; Johnson & Lesniak-Karpiak, 1997; Kerr et al., 1990; Martin et al., 
1992; Rose et al., 1995, 1998). Coaching has been shown to help participants have a 
clearer perception about how to portray a brain injury patient in a more believable 
manner. Thus, to extend existing research, the instructions in this study were 
systematically manipulated in such a way that provided the UCM with no coaching,
MCM with one coaching clue (i.e., make performance believable), and DCM with head 
injury information and cautionary statements (i.e., to make performance believable and to 
not overexaggerate feigned brain damage).
In general, the results from this study do not support the hypotheses or previous 
research regarding coaching effects. The Free Recall portion of the Incidental Learning 
task was the only test in which differences emerged among the malingering groups. 
Further, it was the only test that controls did not do significantly better than all three 
malingering groups. Interestingly, on this test participants who did not receive any 
coaching performed similar to controls and to people who received information about 
head injuries, and they performed significantly better than those participants who
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received minimal coaching. There was an insignificant trend for this pattern to occur 
among the malingering groups on all other tests as well. However, it is unclear why the 
participants without coaching performed similar to control participants on the Free Recall 
task. The following information includes potential explanations regarding the findings 
among the malingering groups.
Throughout this study, the coaching manipulation did not have the effect that was 
expected among the three groups of malingerers. That is, participants who received 
detailed information about head injury sequelae (DCM) and those who received the clue 
to make a believable presentation (MCM) did not perform better than those participants 
who received no additional information (UCM). In fact, there was a trend for the MCM 
to perform worse than the other three groups on the various measures.
It is important to consider potential reasons as to why the coaching manipulation 
did not result in significant differences between the malingerers. It appears that the subtle 
changes made to the scenarios used for the present study may have led to unexpected 
performance among the simulated malingerers. The scenarios for this study were created 
by combining portions of the scenarios used in the Tombaugh (1997) and Rose et al. 
(1998) studies. In certain aspects, the scenario used in Tombaugh (1997) study may 
potentially be perceived as indicating a less severe head injury than the scenario 
presented to the participants in the Rose et al. (1998) study. Additional differences, some 
more subtle than others, exist among the two scenarios. These results suggest that slight 
variations in the content of the scenarios can result in notable changes in participants’ 
performance. Thus, the content of the scenarios appears to be a critical feature of 
malingering research, which has not been previously studied.
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The changes in scenarios likely led to the unexpected results that occurred among 
the UCM and the MCM. Overall, there was a trend for the UCM to perform better than 
was hypothesized. The UCM scored the same as the coached participants and 9 points 
higher than the uncoached participants on the PDRT total score in the Rose et al. (1998) 
study. On the three TOMM trials, the UCM performance was similar to the coached 
participants in the Rees et al. (1998) study. As previously reviewed, participants in the 
Rees et al. (1998) study were allowed 1 week to prepare their head injury presentation 
using any resources available to them. This preparation period served as a coaching 
manipulation for those participants. Again, the differences in the scenarios likely 
contributed to the inconsistent findings between these research studies.
The participants in the MCM group tended to perform worse than hypothesized 
on the various measures. The additional instruction to make their performance believable 
may have had the opposite effect as hypothesized. This clue was added to their 
instructions as a way to serve as a type of coaching. Participants in a study conducted by 
Hall and Parker (1996) were provided a clue to make their presentation believable 
without making it too obvious. Results showed that those participants performed better 
than the coached students in the Rose et al. (1998) study. Thus, for the present study it 
was hypothesized that the MCM would perform better than the UCM because they had 
been provided the clue to make their performance believable. Without any additional 
coaching information, this clue may have encouraged the MCM to overexaggerate their 
feigned symptoms. In other words, two possible interpretations may exist regarding how 
to make a believable presentation (a) to not overexaggerate deficits, leading to better test 
performance, and (b) to make sure the brain damage is seen by the examiner, leading to
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worse performance. An overexaggeration of deficits in malingerers is consistent with 
previous research (Benton & Spreen, 1961; Goebel, 1983; Heaton et al., 1978). The large 
variations within the MCM group’s test performance seem to indicate that the 
participants were unclear about how to act.
The DCM were also told to make their performance believable. However, they 
were provided information about head injuries and warnings (i.e., do not be too obvious 
in the portrayal of brain damage and major exaggerations are noticeable). This additional 
information likely helped them in their portrayal of head injury compared to the MCM 
who did not receive this information. In general, the DCM performed similar to the 
coached participants in other research (Rees et al., 1998; Rose et al., 1998).
Another aspect that differs among malingering research studies involves the 
incentives provided to participants. For example, the present study offered two additional 
credits for participants if they successfully convinced the examiner that they had a brain 
injury. Rose et al. (1998) offered four additional credits. Rees et al. (1998) paid $50 to the 
one person in their study who presented a profile most typical of a brain injury patient. 
Tombaugh (1997) offered a specific amount of experimental credits to their participants; 
however, unlike some studies no additional credits were offered as an extra incentive. It 
is possible that these differences in incentives contribute to inconsistent findings among 
studies.
As hypothesized, all three groups of malingerers performed significantly worse on 
the Pairing portion of the Incidental Learning task than they performed on the Free Recall 
portion of the task. The control participants also performed significantly worse on the 
Pairing portion. In order to receive correct points on the Pairing portion people must
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perform two steps: (a) recall the appropriate symbol and (b) correctly place the symbol 
with the associated number. The Free Recall portion allows more freedom in responses in 
that it requires the person to only recall the symbols without placing any restrictions on 
were to place the symbols. Thus, it is likely that the Pairing portion of the task is more 
difficult than the Free Recall portion as it was for all groups in the present study, 
contributing to the pattern found in test performance. It is interesting to note that the 
malingering groups showed a trend toward a greater disparity in Pairing vs. Free Recall 
scores than the control group. As previously mentioned, no other studies have examined 
malingerers’ performance on the Incidental Learning task. However, Hart et al. (1987) 
used the Incidental Learning task from the WAIS and found no significant differences 
between older adults with depression and older adults without depression for the Free 
Recall task. Furthermore, compared to people without depression, individuals with 
depression performed significantly worse on the Pairing portion of the task.
Contrary to the hypothesis, familiarity with head injury sequelae was not 
positively correlated with participants’ performance on the PDRT or the TOMM. The 
participants in the present study varied in their familiarity with head injury, ranging from 
not at all familiar to very familiar (only a few people were very familiar with head injury 
sequelae). It appears that regardless of the amount of previous knowledge they had about 
head injuries, college students were unsure about how to portray a head injury patient. To 
examine the impact that preexisting knowledge has on malingerers’ performance, Rees et 
al. (1998) asked TBI patients to exaggerate existing deficits or deficits that had since 
subsided. These malingering patients obtained scores similar to college simulators,
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showing that people with familiarity with head injury continue to overexaggerate deficits 
when asked to malinger on the TOMM.
Although the findings were not significant, the MCM group felt the least 
successful compared to the other three groups at hiding their membership from the 
examiner. These results may be due to the fact that the MCM group’s performance was 
overall worse than the other groups. That is, they altered their behavior more drastically 
than members in the other groups; therefore, they may have felt less successful at 
remaining inconspicuous (Bernard, 1991).
It needs to be noted that the control participants rated their effort and success at 
accomplishing their task as significantly better than the malingering participants with no 
significant differences occurring among the three malingering groups. In terms of effort, 
these findings are consistent with previous literature. Rose et al. (1998) found that their 
coached malingerers’ effort was similar to the uncoached malingerers’ effort and 
significantly worse than the effort reported by their controls and head injury patients. 
Bernard (1991) conducted a study using simulators and controls, producing results that 
were similar to the findings in the current study and to Rose et al.’s (1998) findings. 
Bernard (1991) hypothesized that the increased demand to perform in a specific manner 
with little preparation time led the simulators to rate their effort with lower scores. In the 
present study it appears that all malingering groups, regardless of the amount of 
coaching, may have viewed their task as difficult. Their perception of the task may have 
led them to view their effort and their success at accomplishing their task as worse than 
the controls.
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The results of the present research have several implications. Although the 
coaching manipulation did not result in significant differences between malingering 
groups, the findings do shed light on the notion that variations in the content of the 
scenarios among studies lead to substantial differences in participants’ performance. This 
is the first study to identify the critical role of the content of scenarios. The results show 
that researchers’ conclusions that have been drawn for years about malingerers’ 
performance may be questionable and overall inconclusive due to differences in scenarios 
among the experiments.
Differences in the incentives provided to participants may also contribute to 
inconsistent results among experiments. Offering money as an incentive may influence 
participants’ motivation on tests in a different manner than when experimental credits are 
offered. To further complicate matters, the amount of money and experimental credits is 
often very different among studies. Thus, such differences may further lead to 
inconsistent research findings.
Another goal was to examine the face validity of each administered measure. In 
spite of the fact that face validity has been considered to be a very important 
characteristic of a test, few researchers have explored this area (Bomstein, Rossner, Hill, 
& Stepanian, 1994). Researchers have shown that the TOMM has good face validity as a 
memory measure (Rees et al., 1998; Tombaugh, 1997). However, the literature is lacking 
regarding the face validity of other measures. Furthermore, no studies have explored face 
validity to the extent accomplished in the present experiment.
Chan, Schmitt, DeShon, Clause, and Delbridge (1997) showed that participants’ 
test performance, their motivation, and their perceptions regarding the face validity of
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measures all interact during testing procedures. Thus, depending on how people view 
tests, their motivation may be affected as they take the various measures. These findings 
emphasize that it is critical for the PDRT and the TOMM to have good face validity as 
memory tests in order to enhance their efficacy as malingering measures. This also 
suggests that it is important for standard neuropsychological tests to be viewed accurately 
in regards to their true purpose.
The results of the present study showed that the PDRT and the TOMM have good 
face validity as memory tests. Findings also showed that the Pairing portion of the 
Incidental Learning task was most commonly viewed as measuring memory. The TMT 
and the Digit Symbol Coding subtest were most commonly considered higher cognitive 
tests. Furthermore, the BSI was most commonly identified as an emotional status 
questionnaire. The results for the TOMM are consistent with the hypothesis as well as 
Rees et al.’s study (1998) that showed the test has good face validity as a memory test 
when it is embedded in a series of neuropsychological tests. Furthermore, these findings 
are among the first to demonstrate that the PDRT has good face validity as a memory 
measure and to show that standard neuropsychological tests are generally viewed 
accurately.
Once given the clue that some of the tests may be malingering measures, over half 
of the participants classified all the tests as malingering measures, with the TOMM being 
classified by the largest percentage of people. Additionally, the BSI questionnaire was 
classified as a malingering measure by over 30% of the participants. These findings 
indicate that standardized tests and questionnaires may be viewed as malingering 
measures. Furthermore, it appears that college students are poor at identifying whether a
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measure was a malingering test after receiving a clue that some measures were designed 
to detect malingering.
It is important to consider why more students identified the TOMM vs. the PDRT 
as a malingering measure. One possibility is that the TOMM appears to be more similar 
to a memory test than the PDRT. Very few individuals classified the TOMM as 
measuring anything other than memory. Although the PDRT was initially classified by a 
large percentage of participants as a memory test, it was also classified as measuring 
higher cognitive skills and attention by a substantial percentage of people. It is likely that 
the interpolated activity (counting backwards) that is employed with the PDRT helped 
improve the face validity of this malingering test. Thus, the multi-purpose aspects of the 
PDRT may have led fewer individuals to choose it as a malingering measure.
The fact that memory impairment is a common complaint for real patients and 
malingerers (Cercy et al., 1997; Suhr & Gunstad, 2000) may be another potential 
explanation as to why the TOMM was endorsed more frequently than the PDRT as a 
malingering measure. That is, the participants may have believed that the test appearing 
most similar to a memory test was likely designed to be a malingering measure given that 
memory impairment is a common deficit following ahead injury. As previously 
mentioned, the TOMM was endorsed as a memory test by 92% of the people whereas 
only 69% of the participants endorsed the PDRT as measuring only memory (an 
additional 14% also indicated that the PDRT was a measure of memory and attention). 
Researchers have shown that a large percentage of the general public are aware that 
memory impairment can occur following a concussion (Suhr & Gunstad, 2000). 
Additionally, Lees-Haley and Dunn (1994) demonstrated that more than half of their
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introductory psychology students were capable of identifying several symptoms 
associated with mild brain injury. These researchers’ findings may substantiate the 
differences found in endorsement for the TOMM vs. the PDRT.
Participants’ certainty ratings regarding whether a test was a malingering measure 
did not differ among the four groups of participants. Contrary to the hypothesized results, 
the brief information that was provided to the DCM regarding head injury sequelae and 
warnings about how to perform was not adequate for them to feel more confident in their 
ability to identify the malingering measures. These findings may be due to the fact that in 
general college students have limited knowledge regarding the purpose of assessment 
measures, which likely contributed to their uncertainties.
This study was the first known attempt at examining face validity in this manner. 
Interestingly, the participants were unable to discriminate between malingering and 
standard tests on both face-validity questionnaires. Initially, the malingering tests were 
viewed as memory tests. Conversely, after receiving a clue that some tests were designed 
to detect feigned brain damage, the standard tests were viewed as malingering measures. 
The differences between responses indicate that once people are made aware of the 
existence of malingering measures, their views of tests change substantially yet remain 
largely inaccurate. The participants were poor at identifying whether a test was a 
malingering measure in spite of the fact that all tests were initially endorsed as measuring 
memory, attention, speed of information processing, association, thinking, and/or 
reasoning. These findings indicate that even if real patients are aware that malingering 
tests exist, they are likely to be unsure about which tests were designed to detect 
malingering.
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In regards to these findings, it is crucial to gain a better understanding of peoples’ 
beliefs regarding the purpose of each test. It is important that malingering tests be viewed 
as standard tests. It is also important for standard tests to not be viewed as malingering 
measures. As previously mentioned, the manner in which people view tests impacts their 
test performance (Chan et al., 1997). This impact may not be limited to performance on 
individual tests but may affect the entire assessment process.
Finally, the results from the BSI showed that a significant amount of 
psychological symptoms does not negatively impact test performance. That is, 
participants who endorsed many psychological symptoms obtained similar scores on all 
the tests when compared to participants who did not express psychological distress, 
regardless of their group membership. These results indicate that the tests that were 
administered for the present study were not influenced by psychological symptoms in 
spite of the fact that the existence of psychological distress was substantial in this college 
population (41% of the participants had elevated scores indicative of psychological 
problems on the BSI). Elevations in college students may result from their perceptions 
regarding their participation in an experiment (i.e., they may be suspicious and/or 
nervous about the experimental process), stressful experiences related to being a college 
student (i.e., taking tests, meeting many deadlines, living away from home, etc.), and 
issues occurring in their personal lives.
These findings regarding the BSI have important clinical implications because 
many patients who present for neuropsychological assessments are also experiencing 
psychological problems in addition to their neurological sequelae. Thus, the findings may 
shed some light on how psychological distress impacts test results. In spite of these
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findings, a caveat is in order. The degree and type of psychological distress that patients 
with neurological deficits and real malingerers experience may be different and in many 
cases more severe than the distress that our student participants endorsed. In fact, this 
appeared to be the case in the Hart et al. (1987) study. Hart et al. (1987) found that older 
adults experiencing depression performed worse than people without depression on the 
Pairing portion of the Incidental Learning task. Therefore, the impact of psychological 
sequelae must always be considered when interpreting test results.
Limitations o f  the Present Study
As with any simulation study, the generalizability of the results is limited. The 
incentive provided in this study is limited to experimental credits which is obviously not 
as appealing as the incentives in clinical cases (e.g., disability pay, workers’ 
compensation, veterans’ benefits, etc.). Furthermore, the participants were not allowed 
much time to prepare. On the other hand, patients who are feigning illnesses may learn to 
live their lives in ways that portray a true symptom picture. That is, they have an 
increased opportunity to practice living the role of a patient and are likely to learn how to 
present that role more realistically than simulators. An additional limitation lies in the 
fact that a clinical population was not included.
Future Directions
In the future, professionals in neuropsychology need to systematically examine 
the impact that subtle variations in instructions and incentives have on participants’ 
performance in order to gain a better perspective regarding which information tends to 
facilitate test performance and what seems to negatively influence performance. In order 
to provide consistent results that can be compared across future studies, it may be helpful
Malingering and Coaching 76
for researchers to create a standardized malingering scenario and incentive to be used 
across research laboratories.
The present study showed interesting trends regarding malingerers’ and control 
participants’ test performance on the Incidental Learning task, indicating that future 
researchers need to examine performance on this task as an additional method for 
detecting malingering. Additionally, more studies need to be conducted that include 
litigating TBI patients, nonlitigating TBI patients, and people with varying severities of 
TBIs. Furthermore, patients with different types of medical conditions and people with 
neurological impairments other than TBI need to be examined.
Assessing laypersons’ knowledge regarding head injury sequelae needs to be 
explored in future research, particularly as a way to shed light on face validity issues. It is 
unknown how many patients are familiar with head injury sequelae and the fact that some 
tests are designed as malingering measures. Essig, Mittenberg, Peterson, Strauman, and 
Cooper (2001) reported that most attorneys spend time educating their clients about 
neuropsychological assessment procedures. Topics that may be covered include 
malingering, content and names of commonly administered tests, information about head 
injury sequelae, testing strategies, and information that patients need to reveal during an 
interview. This literature substantiates the notion that the coaching and face validity 
aspects that were examined in this study need to be further incorporated into malingering 
research.
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Appendix A
Medical History Form
PLEASE FILL OUT THIS MEDICAL HISTORY FORM.
ALL INFO RM A TIO N  YOU PROVIDE W ILL BE HELD STRICTLY  
CONFIDENTIAL
Yes No
1. Have you ever been diagnosed with any neurological condition?
If so, please list:_________________________________________
2. Have you ever had a blow to your head in which you were 
unconscious for longer than 30 minutes?
3. Have you ever used drugs (e.g., alcohol, recreational drugs, 
Prescription medication) such that it caused you problems
(e.g., difficulties at work, school, or home; other people believing 
that you have a problem with drugs; problems with the law; 
physical or psychological problems)?
If so, please list the specific problem(s) that your substance 
use caused:
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BSI
INSTRUCTIONS:
Below is a list of problems people sometimes have. Please read each one carefully, 
and circle the number to the right that best describes H O W  M U C H  THAT PROBLEM  
HAS D ISTRESSED O R  BO TH ERED YOU DURING THE PAST 7 DAYS  
INCLUDING TODAY. Circle only one number for each problem and do not skip any 
items. If you change your mind, erase your first mark carefully. Read the example below 
before beginning, and if you have any questions please ask about them.
0=Not at all 1=A little bit 2=Moderately 3=Quite a bit
4=Extremely
EXAMPLE
HOW MUCH WERE YOU DISTRESSED BY:
1. Bodyaches 0 1 2 ( 3 J  4
0=Not at all 1=A little bit 2=Moderately 3=Quite a bit 
4=Extremely
HOW MUCH WERE YOU DISTRESSED BY:
1. Nervousness or shakiness inside 1. 0 1 2 3 4
2. Faintness or dizziness 2. 0 1 2 3 4
3. The idea that someone else can control your thoughts 3. 0 1 2 3 4
4. Feeling others are to blame for most of your troubles 4. 0 1 2 3 4
5. Trouble remembering things 5. 0 1 2 3 4
6. Feeling easily annoyed or irritated 6. 0 1 2 3 4
7. Pains in heart or chest 7. 0 1 2 3 4
8. Feeling afraid in open spaces or on the streets 8. 0 1 2 3 4
9. Thoughts of ending your life 9. 0 1 2 3 4
10. Feeling that most people cannot be trusted 10. 0 1 2 3 4
11. Poor appetite 11. 0 1 2 3 4
12. Suddenly scared for no reason 12. 0 1 2 3 4
13. Temper outbursts that you could not control 13. 0 1 2 3 4
14. Feeling lonely even when you are with people 14. 0 1 2 3 4
15. Feeling blocked in getting things done 15. 0 1 2 3 4
16. Feeling lonely 16. 0 1 2 3 4
17. Feeling blue 17. 0 1 2 3 4
18. Feeling no interest in things 18. 0 1 2 3 4
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0=Not at all 1=A little bit 2=Moderately 3=Quite a bit 
4=Extremely
HOW MUCH WERE YOU DISTRESSED BY:
19. Feeling fearful 19. 0 1 2 3 4
20. Your feelings being easily hurt 20. 0 1 2 3 4
21. Feeling that people are unfriendly or dislike you 21. 0 1 2 3 4
22. Feeling inferior to others 22. 0 1 2 3 4
23. Nausea or upset stomach
24. Feeling that you are watched or talked about by
23. 0 1 2 3 4
others 24. 0 1 2 3 4
25. Trouble falling asleep 25. 0 1 2 3 4
26. Having to check and double check what you do 26. 0 1 2 3 4
27. Difficulty making decisions 27. 0 1 2 3 4
28. Feeling afraid to travel on buses, subways, or trains 28. 0 1 2 3 4
29. Trouble getting your breath 29. 0 1 2 3 4
30. Hot or cold spells
31. Having to avoid certain things, places, or activities
30. 0 1 2 3 4
because they frighten you 31. 0 1 2 3 4
32. Your mind going blank 32. 0 1 2 3 4
33. Numbness or tingling in parts of your body 33. 0 1 2 3 4
34. The idea that you should be punished for your sins 34. 0 1 2 3 4
35. Feeling hopeless about the future 35. 0 1 2 3 4
36. Trouble concentrating 36. 0 1 2 3 4
37. Feeling weak in parts of your body 37. 0 1 2 3 4
38. Feeling tense or keyed up 38. 0 1 2 3 4
39. Thoughts of death or dying 39. 0 1 2 3 4
40. Having urges to beat, injure, or harm someone 40. 0 1 2 3 4
41. Having urges to break or smash things 41. 0 1 2 3 4
42. Feeling very self-conscious with others
43. Feeling uneasy in crowds, such as shopping or at
42. 0 1 2 3 4
a movie 43. 0 1 2 3 4
44. Never feeling close to another person 44. 0 1 2 3 4
45. Spells of terror or panic 45. 0 1 2 3 4
46. Getting into frequent arguments 46. 0 1 2 3 4
47. Feeling nervous when you are left alone
48. Others not giving you proper credit for your
47. 0 1 2 3 4
achievements 48. 0 1 2 3 4
49. Feeling so restless you couldn’t sit still 49. 0 1 2 3 4
50. Feelings of worthlessness 50. 0 1 2 3 4
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51. Feeling that people will take advantage of you if 
you let them
52. Feelings of guilt
53. The idea that something is wrong with your mind
51. 0 1 2 3 4
52. 0 1 2 3 4
53. 0 1 2 3 4
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Instructions for Controls
Please follow these instructions for the remainder of the experiment without letting 
the examiner know what you have been told to do! When you finish reading these 
instructions, sign at the bottom indicating that you have read them and understand your 
task. Then, place this signed sheet back into the envelope, seal it, and wait for the 
examiner to return. You will be asked about these instructions later on.
You are about to take some cognitive tests that examine mental abilities such as 
attention, memory, thinking and reasoning skills, and your ability to think quickly. Your 
task is to perform to the best of your ability, answering all questions in as honest a 
fashion as you can.
During the 7 minutes that the examiner is out of the room, remember to sign this 
sheet, place it in the envelope, and seal the envelope before the examiner returns.
Again, do not let the examiner know what these instructions have told you to do. 
Your performance on the tests should be the only way someone could figure it out.
Thank you very much for your participation.
I have read these instructions and will do my best to follow them for the remainder
of the experiment.
(Signature)
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Instructions for Uncoached Malingerers
Please follow these instructions for the remainder of the experiment without letting 
the examiner know what you have been told to do! When you finish reading these 
instructions, sign at the bottom indicating that you have read them and understand your 
task. Then, place this signed sheet back into the envelope, seal it, and wait for the 
examiner to return. You will be asked about these instructions later on.
You are about to take some cognitive tests that examine mental abilities such as 
attention, memory, thinking and reasoning skills, and your ability to think quickly. While 
responding to the tests, please pretend that you have experienced brain damage from a car 
accident involving a head-on collision. You hit your head against the windshield and 
were knocked out for 15 minutes. Afterwards, you felt “dazed” so you were hospitalized 
overnight for observation. Because the driver of the other car is at fault, you have decided 
to go to court to get money from the person responsible. During the next few months 
following the accident, the negative effects from your head injury disappear. Your 
lawsuit has not been settled yet, and your lawyer has told you that you may get more 
money if you look like you are still suffering from brain damage.
As you pretend to be this car accident victim, try to respond to each test as a patient 
who is trying to appear brain damaged in order to get money from the lawsuit. Thus, your 
performance on the tests should convince the examiner as well as the people involved in 
deciding the outcome of your lawsuit that you are still suffering from brain damage. I f  
you succeed in convincing the examiner that you have suffered a brain injury, you will 
receive two additional experimental credits, fo r a total o f  6 credits.
During the 7 minutes that the examiner is out of the room, you may prepare for the 
examination. Remember to sign this sheet, place it in the envelope, and seal the envelope 
before the examiner returns. Again, do not let the examiner know what these instructions 
have told you to do. Your performance on the tests should be the only way someone 
could figure it out.
Thank you very much for your participation.
I have read these instructions and will do my best to follow them for the remainder
of the experiment.
(Signature)
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Instructions for Minimally Coached Malingerers
Please follow these instructions for the remainder of the experiment without letting 
the examiner know what you have been told to do! When you finish reading these 
instructions, sign at the bottom indicating that you have read them and understand your 
task. Then, place this signed sheet back into the envelope, seal it, and wait for the 
examiner to return. You will be asked about these instructions later on.
You are about to take some cognitive tests that examine mental abilities such as 
attention, memory, thinking and reasoning skills, and your ability to think quickly. While 
responding to the tests, please pretend that you have experienced brain damage from a car 
accident involving a head-on collision. You hit your head against the windshield and 
were knocked out for 15 minutes. Afterwards, you felt “dazed” so you were hospitalized 
overnight for observation. Because the driver of the other car is at fault, you have decided 
to go to court to get money from the person responsible. During the next few months 
following the accident, the negative effects from your head injury disappear. Your 
lawsuit has not been settled yet, and your lawyer has told you that you may get more 
money if you look like you are still suffering from brain damage.
As you pretend to be this car accident victim, try to respond to each test as a patient 
who is trying to appear brain damaged in order to get money from the lawsuit. Thus, your 
performance on the tests should convince the examiner as well as the people involved in 
deciding the outcome of your lawsuit that you are still suffering from brain damage. In 
order to convince these individuals, your brain damage must be believable. I f  you succeed 
in convincing the examiner that you have suffered a brain injury, you will receive two 
additional experimental credits, for a total o f  6 credits.
During the 7 minutes that the examiner is out of the room, you may prepare for the 
examination. Remember to sign this sheet, place it in the envelope, and seal the envelope 
before the examiner returns. Again, do not let the examiner know what these instructions 
have told you to do. Your performance on the tests should be the only way someone 
could figure it out.
Thank you very much for your participation.
I have read these instructions and will do my best to follow them for the remainder
of the experiment.
(Signature)
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Instructions for Detailed Coached Malingerers
Please follow these instructions for the remainder of the experiment without letting 
the examiner know what you have been told to do! When you finish reading these 
instructions, sign at the bottom indicating that you have read them and understand your 
task. Then, place this signed sheet back into the envelope, seal it, and wait for the 
examiner to return. You will be asked about these instructions later on.
You are about to take some cognitive tests that examine mental abilities such as 
attention, memory, thinking and reasoning skills, and your ability to think quickly. While 
responding to the tests, please pretend that you have experienced brain damage from a car 
accident involving a head-on collision. You hit your head against the windshield and 
were knocked out for 15 minutes. Afterwards, you felt “dazed” so you were hospitalized 
overnight for observation. Because the driver of the other car is at fault, you have decided 
to go to court to get money from the person responsible. During the next few months 
following the accident, the negative effects from your head injury disappear. Your 
lawsuit has not been settled yet, and your lawyer has told you that you may get more 
money if you look like you are still suffering from brain damage.
As you pretend to be this car accident victim, try to respond to each test as a patient 
who is trying to appear brain damaged in order to get money from the lawsuit. Thus, your 
performance on the tests should convince the examiner as well as the people involved in 
deciding the outcome of your lawsuit that you are still suffering from brain damage. In 
order to convince these individuals, your brain damage must be believable. I f  you succeed 
in convincing the examiner that you have suffered a brain injury, you will receive two 
additional experimental credits, for a total o f  6 credits.
Try to produce the most severe problems that you can without making it too obvious 
to the examiner. Major exaggerations, such as remembering absolutely nothing, are easy 
to detect. If the examiner does not believe that you have any problems you will not get 
any money for your head injury. People who have a head injury often have problems 
paying attention, cannot remember things as well, and do not learn things as easily as 
they did before their injury. They also think a little slower than they used to. Keep this in 
mind when taking the tests. Remember you are to try to mimic the performance of 
persons who are truly brain damaged.
During the 7 minutes that the examiner is out of the room, you may prepare for the 
examination. Remember to sign this sheet, place it in the envelope, and seal the envelope 
before the examiner returns. Again, do not let the examiner know what these instructions 
have told you to do. Your performance on the tests should be the only way someone 
could figure it out.
Thank you very much for your participation.
I have read these instructions and will do my best to follow them for the remainder
of the experiment.
(Signature
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Post-Experimental Questionnaire 1
1. Please summarize the instructions you read at the beginning of this experiment.
2. Indicate how hard you tried to follow the instructions you were given at the beginning 
of the experiment by circling the number that best describes your effort.
1 2 3 4 5
Didn’t try at all Tried moderately hard Tried very hard
3. Indicate how successful you think you were in producing the results asked of you in 
the instructions by circling the number that best describes your success.
1 2 3 4 5
Not at all Successful Somewhat Successful Very Successful
4. Do you think you were successful in keeping the examiner from discovering your 
group membership (i.e., successful at concealing what your instructions told you to do)?
Yes No
5. Indicate how familiar you are with the effects that are often associated with a head 
injury by circling the number that best describes your familiarity.
1 2 3 4 5
Not at all Familiar Somewhat Familiar Very Familiar
6. What do you think the test with 50 different pictures was designed to measure? 
(Please write only one purpose for the test)
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Post-Experimental Questionnaire 1
7. What do you think the test with the 5-digit numbers was designed to measure? (Please 
write only one purpose for the test)
8. What do you think the test with different numbers in circles (connected in dot-to-dot 
fashion) was designed to measure? (Please write only one purpose for the test)
9. What do you think the test with different numbers and letters in circles (connected in 
dot-to-dot fashion) was designed to measure? (Please write only one purpose for the test)
10. What do you think the test with different numbers and symbols (the test that 
provided a key matching symbols with numbers) was designed to measure? (Please write 
only one purpose for the test)
11. For the test with different numbers and symbols, what do you think the part with the 
numbers provided with blank squares was designed to measure? (Please write only one 
purpose for the test)
12. What do you think the questionnaire titled BSI containing 53 questions was designed 
to measure? (Please write only one purpose for the questionnaire)
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Post-Experimental Questionnaire 2
It is possible that some of the tests you took today were designed to detect if 
someone is faking brain damage, while others are tests typically administered to test 
cognitive abilities such as memory, attention, and speed of information processing. 
Please put a check by any test that you took today that seemed as if it were designed to 
detect whether someone is faking brain damage. IF you mark a test, please indicate how 
certain you are that the test was designed to detect faked brain damage by circling the 
number that best describes your certainty.
50 pictures
1
Not at all Certain
2 3 4 
Somewhat Certain
5
Very Certain
5-digit numbers
1
Not at all Certain
2 3 4 
Somewhat Certain
5
Very Certain
Numbers in circles (connected in dot-to-dot fashion)
1
Not at all Certain
2 3 4 
Somewhat Certain
5
Very Certain
Numbers and letters in circles (connected in dot-to-dot fashion)
1
Not at all Certain
2 3 4 
Somewhat Certain
5
Very Certain
Matching numbers and symbols (the test that provided the number and symbol key)
1 2 
Not at all Certain
3 4 
Somewhat Certain
5
Very Certain
Matching numbers and symbols (the part that provided numbers with blank 
squares)
1 2 
Not at all Certain
3 4 
Somewhat Certain
5
Very Certain
Questionnaire titled BSI with 53 questions
1 2 3 4 5
Not at all Certain Somewhat Certain Very Certain
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Informed Consent
Principal Investigator': Melody Huskey, Dept, of Psychology, The University of Montana,
Missoula, MT 59812, 243-4521 
Faculty Supervisor: Dr. Stuart Hall, Dept, of Psychology, The University of Montana, 
Missoula, MT 59812, 243-5667
Thank you for considering to participate in this study. This consent form may 
contain concepts that are unfamiliar to you. If the contents of this form are unclear, please 
ask the examiner to explain them to you. The purpose of this study is to investigate the 
effects of motivation on various tests. Additionally, we will be comparing the 
characteristics of the tests. If you agree to take part in this research study you will be 
administered some tests that examine mental abilities such as attention, memory, thinking 
and reasoning skills, and your ability to think quickly. Additionally, you will be asked to 
complete some questionnaires regarding problems that you may have had, some feelings 
you may have experienced, and drug and alcohol use. The session will last approximately 
two hours and will take place in the Skaggs building or the Clinical Psychology Center.
It is expected that the amount of discomfort you experience will be minimal. Some 
of the questions on the various questionnaires may cause you to feel uncomfortable or 
sad. Moreover, at times you may feel frustrated while completing the different tests. If 
these feelings occur, feel free to discuss them with the examiner and to contact the 
principal investigator or faculty supervisor at the numbers provided above.
Participating in this study, will benefit you by providing you with experimental 
credits and giving you exposure to scientific research in psychology. Your participation 
will also provide beneficial information to professionals in the field of psychology.
The information you provide will be held strictly confidential by the research 
examiners (*see limits o f  confidentiality below). Your name will not be marked on the 
test answer sheets and questionnaires. However, if you agree to participate in this study, 
you will need to sign this form, which will be kept locked up and separate from all testing 
and questionnaire materials. We will have you note your age, gender, and years of 
education, but this personal identification information will not be attached to this form 
that contains your name. You will be assigned a participant number that will be used to 
help us keep your data sheets organized. The information that you provide will be read 
only by the principal investigator (Melody Huskey), the faculty supervisor (Dr. Stuart 
Hall), and the research assistants. Your test and questionnaire responses will be kept a 
minimum of 5 years after the study has ended; however, this sheet containing your name 
and phone number will be destroyed at the conclusion of the study. * There are conditions 
under which confidentiality may be breached. I f  you indicate wanting to harm yourself or 
someone else, then this informed consent form will be given to Dr. John Klocek (licensed 
clinical psychologist) who will contact you. Because o f  this, we also require that you 
provide your name and phone number below.
Name (print) Phone
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Informed Consent
Although there is minimal risk associated with your participation in this study, 
The University of Montana requires that the following paragraph be included in all 
consent forms.
“In the event that you are injured as a result of this research you should 
individually seek appropriate medical treatment. If the injury is caused by the negligence 
of the University or any of its employees, you may be entitled to reimbursement or 
compensation pursuant to the Comprehensive State Insurance Plan established by the 
Department of Administration under the authority of M.C.A., Title 2, Chapter 9. In the 
event of a claim for such injury, further information may be obtained from the 
University's Claims representative or University Legal Counsel. (Reviewed by University 
Legal Counsel, July 6, 1993).”
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary, and you may withdraw without 
penalty or any negative consequences. If you choose to withdraw, all your records will be 
destroyed, and the data you provided will not be used in this study.
If you have questions about this study now or during this session, please ask the 
examiner. Additionally, you may contact the principal investigator (Melody Huskey, 243- 
4521) if you continue to be unclear about the study. We will not be able to give you 
extensive feedback regarding your responses; however, you will be provided with 
additional information at the Conclusion of the study. If you have any questions regarding 
your rights as a research subject, you may contact Dr. Rudbach (Chair of the IRB, 243- 
6670).
I have read the above description of this study and have been informed of the 
benefits and risks involved. All of my questions have been answered to my satisfaction, 
and I have been provided contact information for the principal investigator and the 
faculty supervisor in the event that I have concerns or questions in the future. By signing 
below I voluntarily agree to participate in this study and give my consent to the 
examiners to use the information I provide for the purposes of this experiment. I 
understand I will receive a copy of this consent form.
Printed Name of Subject
Subject’s Signature Date
Examiner’s Signature Date
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Debriefing Statement
Thank you for participating in this experiment. The purpose of this study was to 
examine the ability of different tests to detect if someone is faking a brain injury. Another 
goal of the study was to see if providing different amounts of information about brain 
injuries would affect how someone performs on these tests. Some subjects were simply 
asked to perform to the best of their abilities.
All subjects in this experiment played a very important role. The results from this 
experiment will enhance our knowledge about how people perform on these tests and 
whether or not they are giving their best effort. We thank you for your time in helping 
with our research.
We request that you please not discuss the details of this experiment with anyone 
who may be participants. Providing people details before completing the study may 
contaminate our results. However, by providing the information on this debriefing 
statement, the purpose will be thoroughly explained to all subjects at the conclusion of 
the experiment. Furthermore, participants will be allowed to ask questions following 
completion of the experiment.
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Control Participants With Scores Above and Below Cutoff on
the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI)
Test
Controls3
M
(SD)
Group
Controlsb
BSI
M
(SD)
t P
TOMM 49.26 49.80
Trial 1 (.93) (.45) -1.23 .230
TOMM 49.95 50.00
Trial 2 (.23) (.00) -.51 .619
TOMM 50.00 50.00
Retention (.00) (.00)
PDRT 64.47 64,40
Total (4.21) (3.29) .04 .971
Trails A 16.95 20.20
(3.79) (6.46) -1.47 .155
Trails B 41.74 , 46.60
(9.67) (13.94) -.92 .370
Digit Symbol 83.42 87.00
Coding (10.83) (15.05) -.61 ,549
Incidental Learning 14.84 16.60
Pairing (3.48) (.89) -1.10 .283
Incidental Learning 8.05 8.00
Free Recall (1.13) (.71) .10 .923
Note. Groups that are designated as “BSI” obtained scores at or above the cutoff. 
No t values are available for TOMM Retention Trial because the standard 
deviations for both groups are 0. V =  19. bn = 5. Two-tailed independent 
t-tests showed no significant differences for the tests.
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DCM Participants With Scores Above and Below Cutoff on
the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI)
Test
DCMa
M
(SD)
Group
DCMb
BSI
M
(SD)
t P
TOMM 33.47 32.89.
Trial 1 (10.26) (10.01) .14 .894
TOMM 35.00 36.56
Trial 2 (11.05) (11.79) -.33 .748
TOMM 35.00 37.11
Retention (10.73) (13.81) -.42 .679
PDRT 42.53 40.11
Total (10.91) (12.11) .51 .618
Trails A 36.40 41.56
(18.92) (21.96) -.61 .549
Trails B 69.13 73.89
(39.03) (28.23) -.32 .754
Digit Symbol 64.27 63.00
Coding (20.15) (24.82) .14 .892
Incidental Learning 10.93 9.78
Pairing (4.99) (3.27) .62 .544
Incidental Learning 6.53 6.44
Free Recall (1.36) (1.42) .15 .880
Note. Groups that are designated as “BSI” obtained scores at or above the cutoff.
an = 15. hn = 9. Two-tailed independent t-tests showed no significant
differences for the tests.
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MCM Participants With Scores Above and Below Cutoff on 
the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI)
Test
MCMa
M
(SD)
Group
MCMb
BSI
M
(SD)
t P
TOMM 32.82 27.85
Trial 1 (10.66) (9.96) 1.18 .250
TOMM 33.91 29.23
Trial 2 (12.63) (11.79) .94 .359
TOMM 31.64 27.77
Retention (13.89) (13.16) .70 .492
PDRT 37.09 37.00
Total (10.12) (11.57) .02 .984
Trails A 51.18 57.15
(43.72) (40.00) -.35 .730
Trails B 91.55 94.08
(54.74) (51.88) -.12 .909
Digit Symbol 57.91 57.54
Coding (27.93) (23.67) .04 .972
Incidental Learning 9.27 8.38
Pairing (5.82) (4.74) .41 .684
Incidental Learning 5.64 6.08
Free Recall (3.04) (1.50) -.46 .649
Note. Groups that are designated as “BSI” obtained scores at or above the cutoff.
a« = 11. bn = 13. Two-tailed independent t-tests showed no significant
differences for the tests.
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UCM Participants With Scores Above and Below Cutoff on
the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI)
Test
UCMa
M
(SD)
Group
UCMb
BSI
M
(SD)
t P
TOMM 34.83 33.42
Trial 1 (13.97) (11.11) -.28 .786
TOMM 33.83 35.75
Trial 2 (16.60) (12.96) -.32 .756
TOMM 33.17 36.92
Retention (15.05) (15.00) -.61 .547
PDRT 41.83 38.42
Total (12.16) (11.07) .72 .479
Trails A 38.00 40.17
(20.48) (20.53) -.26 .798
Trails B 63.33 85.92
(17.95) (36.94) -1.91 .070
Digit Symbol 67.58 63.75
Coding (15.38) (23.09) .48 .637
Incidental Learning 12.58 10.42
Pairing (4.72) (5.93) .99 .333
Incidental Learning 7.58 6.83
Free Recall (1.16) (1.90) 1.17 .256
Note. Groups that are designated as “BSI” obtained scores at or above the cutoff.
an = 12. hn = 12.Two-tailed independent t-tests showed no significant
differences for the tests.
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Correlated Proportions Analyses for Comparing Classification 
Rates for the TOMM and the PDRT
Chance Level Raites
TOMM Total
PDRT
10a 17 b 27
43c 2d 45
Total 53 19 72
Note. Classified only by the PDRT. Classified by both the PDRT and the TOMM.
c dClassified by none of the tests. Classified only by the TOMM. 
z = d -  a/square root[a + d].
Cutoff Score Rates
PDRT
TOMM Total
3a 32b 35
18c 19d 37
Total 21 51 72
Note. Classified only by the PDRT. Classified by both the PDRT and the TOMM.
c • d • rClassified by none of the tests. Classified only by the TOMM. 
z = d -  a/square root[a + d].
